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CHILDREN IN NEED: OBSERVATIONS OF PRACTICES OF
THE DENVER JUVENILE COURT*
By LYNNE M. HUFNAGEL,** JOHN P. DAVIDSON***
I. INTRODUCTION
There are a growing number of empirical studies of the juve-
nile court, focusing most particularly on the implementation and
impact of rights accorded juveniles in In re Gault' and subsequent
decisions. One certain impact of the Gault decision is that law-
yers may now discuss the juvenile court and its problems, appar-
ently secure in the knowledge that the juvenile court is, afterall,
a forum that trades in rights and remedies in much the same
manner as the civil and criminal courts in which lawyers have
traditionally performed their services. Law review articles paying
homage to Gault have billowed forth in recent years, not unlike
a Gargantuan sigh, as though reflecting communal relief at the
entry of juvenile law into the familiar adversary arena.
Another apparent impact of the Gault dec'sion has been in-
creased public interest in and access to what is happening in the
juvenile courts, about which much has been written and little is
known. One who spends time in the juvenile court may easily
develop a vague feeling that the law ultimately has very little to
do with a vast portion of the day-to-day processing of juveniles
through the juvenile justice system. While the historical parens
patriae orientation of the juvenile court would certainly have ac-
counted for that impression at one time, the feeling comes as
something of a surprise in the context of Gault and its progeny.
Five years after Gault, the likely explanation for this feeling is
that the rights accorded juveniles by Gault have probably not
been implemented-so the question of whether implementation
has occurred arises rather naturally.
* This article is the result of a study conducted by Lynne M. Hufnagel and John P.
Davidson under a grant from the American Bar Foundation to the Denver Law Journal.
The author and the Journal wish to express their sincere appreciation to both the Ameri-
can Bar Foundation and to the Project Director of the American Bar Foundation's Law
Review Research Project, Barlow F. Christensen, for their continued support and interest.
** Research Consultant, Colorado Department of Institutions, Office of Youth Serv-
ices; J.D., 1971, University of Denver College of Law.
* ** Partner, Kastler, Erwin, and Davidson, Raton, New Mexico; B.A., 1969, Univer-
sity of Denver; J.D., 1972, University of Denver.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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It was such a question that originally motivated the study
from which this article resulted. The result, however, is not prin-
cipally an implementation study. The typical focus of an imple-
mentation study is to determine whether there has been local
compliance with a legal mandate, whether compliance accom-
plished the policy goals which the mandate was designed to
achieve, or whether compliance is possible at all. The focus of an
implementation study, consequently, is on the law and its rela-
tionship, in practical terms, to the situation in which it is in-
tended to operate. An implementation study in the juvenile area
might be motivated by one of two assumptions: first, that be-
cause Gault is the law (and therefore assumed to be beneficial),
it should and can be enforced; or second, that because Gault
represents a recent judicial re-evaluation of recognized problems
in the juvenile court, its enforcement will solve the problems of
the juvenile court.
The alternative assumptions on which this article is based
are that the problems facing the juvenile court are not so simple
that mere implementation of the recognized rights of juveniles
will serve to alleviate them; that the juvenile laws are merely one
element among a group of forces that influence the behavior of
the juvenile court bureaucracy and its success, however defined,
in dealing with the problems assigned to it, and that these laws
may in fact have only a negligible influence; that the juvenile law
may be, at any given time, as much a part of the problem as a
part of the solution; that a bare examination of court practices
to determine whether a court has complied with the express re-
quirements of Gault and other decisions, though legitimate for
that limited purpose, fails to account for the impact of such sub-
tle factors as the child's capacity to comprehend his rights, sys-
tematic pressures on the child which influence him to waive his
rights, or the effectiveness of counsel when that right is not
waived; that the concept of "implementation" in the juvenile
area has not developed beyond "compliance" and fails to take the
above factors into account; and that, consequently, the problems
of the juvenile court are deserving of a broader, less restricted
approach, in which both legal and social issues are given cogniz-
ance.
No attempt is made here to quantify practices or trends in
the court. The object of this article is to identify problem areas
and to suggest topics for further study. The objective of the study
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was exploratory and the data presented are predominantly im-
pressionistic in form. It is submitted that approaches of more
narrow scope at the present time fail to comprehend the complex
interrelation of law, bureaucracy, and social problems that meet
in the present-day juvenile court.
II. METHODOLOGY
Various legal and administrative requirements connected
with the processing of a child through the juvenile court system
have resulted in the development of a series of critical
junctures-established decisionmaking points, each of which has
the result of either progressing the child in the system, or turning
him out of it. These critical junctures may involve the input of
several individuals with differing functions or, in some instances,
may be controlled by a single individual. The child may or may
not be an active participant in the particular decisionmaking
process. The critical junctures identified in this study and used
as units for the organization and presentation of the observational
results of the study include: (1) referral to the juvenile court by
police, parents, and school officials; (2) probation department
decision to detain pending detention hearing; (3) detention hear-
ing; (4) decision to file a petition, handle informally, or handle
unofficially;' (5) plea hearing; (6) omnibus hearing; (7) adjudica-
tory hearing; (8) dispositional hearing; and (9) subsequent hear-
ings to review placement.
The critical junctures listed do not include the taking of a
child into custody (arrest) or the eventual decision to release the
child from institutional commitment, but do cover all other deci-
sions resulting in referral to or severance from the court system .'
I See note 85 infra concerning recent statutory changes affecting this critical junc-
ture.
One additional decisionmaking point which is not covered in this study is the
transfer hearing provided for in ch. 110, § 19, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 391, amending
CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-8(1) (Supp. 1969):
(1)(a) At the transfer hearing, the court shall consider:
(b) Whether there is probable cause to believe that the child has
committed an act for which waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction
over the child and transfer to the district court may be sought. ..
; and
(c) Whether the interests of the child or of the community would
be better served by the juvenile court waiving its jurisdiction over
the child and transferring jurisdiction over him to the district
court.
While this decision certainly involves a juvenile court decision of a critical nature, it was
1974
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Observations relating to each juncture will include specific exam-
ples from particular case studies, as well as aggregate impres-
sions.
Following a description of the facilities and personnel of the
Denver Juvenile Court and of the characteristics common to all
critical junctures, each decisionmaking point will be viewed from
several perspectives. Second, the legal bases and administrative
guidelines which are intended to govern each critical juncture will
be discussed.4 Third, the decisionmakers at each critical juncture
will be described, both as they are contemplated in law and as
they function in fact. Both the consequences of their actions upon
the child and his family, and the legal alternatives open to the
court and to the attorneys at each critical juncture will be ana-
lyzed.
The primary research method utilized was in the form of
informal and structured interviews with participants in Denver's
juvenile justice system, observation of court practices and proce-
dures, and the assumption of the role of student counsel in the
Denver Juvenile Court by the principal investigators. Under Rule
226 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, law students are
"authorized to appear in . .. courts of the state as if licensed to
not included in the series of critical junctures discussed fully for two reasons. First, in the
Denver Juvenile Court, the transfer hearing is a fairly rare occurrence. A past presiding
judge estimated that only about twelve transfer hearings per year are requested by the
district attorney's office, and less than half of those result in a transfer of jurisdiction over
the child from the Denver Juvenile Court to the criminal division of the district court.
Secondly, the transfer hearing does not result in progressing the child through the system
or turning him out of it in the same manner as do the critical junctures discussed in the
text. If the juvenile court retains jurisdiction over the child, the child proceeds to the plea
hearing as if the transfer hearing had never occurred and from that critical juncture on is
subject to the same procedures as any other child. If the transfer hearing results in a
transfer of jurisdiction to the criminal division of the district court, the child has been
turned out of the juvenile justice system, but must still wend his way through the adult
system. Because of the narrow scope of the transfer hearing, no findings or decision other
than these two can be made by the juvenile court. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541 (1966), for discussion of due process requirements in transfer hearings.
I This study does not purport to be a comparative analysis of legal precedents and
administrative procedures in juvenile courts throughout the country. While such an analy-
sis of extant juvenile law and procedure would be extremely valuable, it is the purpose of
this study to give an in-depth analysis of a- single urban juvenile court-Denver Juvenile
Court-and the law and procedures which govern it. It is recognized that important case
law is being formulated in other states; however, it is suggested that differing administra-
tive procedures in the urban juvenile courts of other states and the relative breadth and
liberality of the Colorado Children's Code would in most instances significantly reduce
the import and impact of those decisions in Colorado.
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practice" when they are representing poor persons under the aus-
pices of a legal aid dispensary. Early in 1971, this rule was con-
strued to cover the representation by law students of Children in
Need of Supervision (CHINS) in the juvenile court under the
auspices of the Legal Aid Society of Metropolitan Denver and the
University of Denver College of Law Student Internship Program.
Since January of 1971, student attorneys, under the direct super-
vision of staff attorneys of the Legal Aid Society have been in-
volved in the bulk of representation of CHINS in the Denver
Juvenile Court.
Both principal investigators participated in the Juvenile
Court Internship Program as student attorneys at various times
during the period of the study and therefore had relatively easy
access to the personnel and procedures in the court on a rather
informal basis. Other observations and interviews were con-
ducted under the direct auspices of the Denver Law Journal
study. Impressions of the researchers cover generally the period
from January 1971 through June 1972.1 Both as student attorneys
and as researchers not directly involved in the proceeding being
observed, we observed all critical junctures at random times. As
student attorneys we had the additional exposure of interviewing
children detained by the intake division of the probation depart-
ment, representing them in detention hearings, discussing the
filing of the petition with the probation officers (plea-bargaining,
if you will), interviewing parents involved, and actually repre-
senting the child during subsequent critical junctures. As student
attorneys-actual participants in the juvenile justice system-we
were also subjected to many of the same pressures which influ-
ence the behavior of the more traditional participants in the
court-judges, probation officers, and police. While the possibil-
ity for organizational cooptation of student counsel in the Denver
Juvenile Court was perhaps not as real as for those attorneys who
practice regularly and over an extended period of time in the
court, student counsel certainly felt the press of the court's tre-
mendous workload, the impact of the lack of treatment facilities,
and the role conflict implicit in balancing the best interests of the
child with the necessity of working within the realm of the possi-
I One of the principal researchers has been continually working as an attorney in the
Denver Juvenile Court and has been able, where necessary, to update information ob-
tained from the interviews which is no longer accurate.
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ble. Maintaining a fairly cordial working relationship with court
staff, in most instances, was essential to moving a case through
the system, but often ran contrary to the adversary role of counsel
necessary to presenting the case properly to the court. As re-
searchers, we attempted to be aware of these pressures, both to
avoid a personal impact on the functioning of the system, and to
be able to assess more objectively the impact of counsel on the
court itself.
Interviews conducted during the major portion of the study
were informal and unstructured and occurred during or following
observations of critical junctures. Among those interviewed were
juveniles and their parents, officers and detectives in the Delin-
quency Control Division of the Denver Police Department, proba-
tion officers, Denver Juvenile Court judges and referees, juvenile
court administrators, public defenders and legal aid attorneys
working in the juvenile court, legislators involved with proposals
affecting the Colorado Children's Code, administrators of various
state and private placement facilities, school administrators, and
a newspaper reporter whose principal function was to cover the
juvenile court. Toward the final stages of research, structured
interviews were conducted with representative groups from the
Denver Juvenile Court itself, including probation officers, juve-
nile court administrators, and juvenile court judges and referees.
In addition to obtaining additional information, the object of the
final round of structured interviews was to present the tentative
results of previous observations and interviews for the purpose of
obtaining reactions to and evaluations of our conclusions.
III. PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES OF THE DENVER JUVENILE COURT
[O]ur judges and referees continue to maintain voluminous case-
loads without relief in sight .... There can be but few courts in
Colorado or the entire country that are sustaining caseloads such as
these.
By 9 o'clock in the morning on any weekday, the wooden
benches in the south end of the Denver City and County Building
are sagging with the weight of parents and children waiting for
their day in court. Passing among them in the dark hallway are
public defenders negotiating last-minute plea bargains, proba-
tion counselors trying to ascertain whether necessary parties are
present, private attorneys, and an occasional sheriff's deputy
leading a handcuffed child to a courtroom to face the judge. A
couple of miles to the northeast, parents wait on more comforta-
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ble chairs in Denver's well-lit, air conditioned juvenile detention
facility, juvenile hall, where they strain for glimpses of their chil-
dren being escorted from detention units to appear before the
juvenile court referee. After what frequently must seem to be an
interminable delay, parent and child appear before the court to
receive "juvenile justice" and be sent on their sometimes separate
ways.
In the 1970-71 fiscal year, judges and referees in the Denver
Juvenile Court were assigned an average of 1,496 cases.' The pro-
jected caseload for 1971-72 was 1,344 and for the following fiscal
year, 1,695. The total number of petitions filed in 1970-71 was
5,983, and 5,374 were projected for the following year. Yet by June
1, 1972, the intake division of the probation department had al-
ready handled 2,952 cases of delinquency, children in need of
supervision, and out-of-town runaways. This staggering caseload
must be explained briefly to be clearly understood.
Chapter 22 of the Colorado Revised Statutes, 1963, as
amended, hereinafter referred to as the Code,7 confers broad juris-
diction upon the juvenile courts. Exclusive original jurisdiction is
given not only in proceedings concerning delinquent children,
children in need of supervision, and dependent and neglected
children, but also in all adoption proceedings, proceedings to de-
termine the paternity, legal custody, support, or guardianship of
a child or involving the termination or relinquishment of parental
rights, and proceedings in which an adult is charged with contrib-
uting to the delinquency of a child. This list suggests the broad
range of proceedings which may be conducted daily in the Denver
Juvenile Court.'
Court Statistics, District 2, Denver Juvenile Court, at 2 (1972). These statistics are
compiled annually by the court and used for analysis as well as budget requests. Any
statistics cited further in this section are drawn from this compilation by the court which
is neither published nor distributed to the public at large. Further mention of statistics
in the text will not be footnoted.
The Colorado Children's Code was enacted in 1967 and preceded the Supreme Court
decision In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the first case according significant due process
rights to juveniles. The Code has been amended yearly to conform with later decisions,
changes in state facilities, and developing views as to what is "in the best interest of the
child and the community."
' The full extent of the jurisdiction of juvenile courts in Colorado may be found in
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-4 (Supp. 1967), as amended, ch. 110, §§ 2-4, [1973] Colo.
Sess. Laws 384-85. There is support among the personnel of the Denver Juvenile Court
for changing the jurisdiction to exclude paternity and support proceedings and concen-
trate more fully on the problems of adolescent offenders; however, it is unlikely that the
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Since early in 1971, the judicial personnel of the Denver Ju-
venile Court have included two full-time judges and two full-time
referees. In July 1973, a third judgeship was allocated for Denver
Juvenile Court by the Colorado General Assembly. A juvenile
judge is appointed by the governor from a list of three names
submitted by the Judicial Commission of the Second Judicial
District. Judges face retention elections every 6 years. Referees in
the Denver Juvenile Court are appointed by the juvenile judge
under whom they serve at that judge's pleasure.' By statute, ref-
erees must be licensed to practice law in Colorado,'0 and the
administrative guidelines of the Denver Juvenile Court require
that they have practiced law at least 3 years. With the exceptions
of jury trials and transfer hearings," referees are empowered to
hear any case or matter under the court's jurisdiction. Although
parties have a right to an initial hearing before a judge, if they
waive their right a referee will hear the case and make findings
and recommendations to a judge.'2 If no rehearing before the
judge is requested,and if the judge, on his own motion, does not
order a rehearing, 3 the judge will approve or disapprove the rec-
ommendations of the referee. The recommendations become a
final order of the court only upon such approval. 4
In the Denver Juvenile Court, the referees hear all detention
hearings, the great majority of plea hearings, a majority of the
dispositional hearings, and most of the review or further disposi-
tional hearings. The judges hear all jury trials, transfer hearings,
and omnibus hearings and the majority of trials to court. 5 Judges
legislature would support such a move in the near future, especially since it is only the
urbanized Denver Juvenile Court which is pushing for the change. As support for their
position, court personnel have documented that in fiscal year 1970-71 paternity and sup-
port proceedings accounted for 1,615 of the 5,983 new petitions filed, more than any other
single type of proceeding. There is a feeling, particularly among the judicial officers of the
court, that the Denver Juvenile Court's primary function in these proceedings is to act as
a collection agency for the Department of Welfare.




13 Ch. 110, § 8, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 387, amending COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-
1-10(5) (Supp. 1967).
11 Id. See People v. J.A.M., 174 Colo. 245, 483 P.2d 362 (1971), wherein the court held
that the procedure was a two-stage factfinding process and that no jeopardy attached
during the first stage.
11 With the exception of support proceedings, which are handled primarily by the
referees, the other proceedings within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court are handled
primarily by the judges.
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and referees both prefer to preside at the dispositional hearings
of those children whose trials they have heard, rather than to
transfer the case to another judicial officer for disposition.
Responsibility for investigating child in need of supervision
cases has been delegated to the probation department of the
court." During the first 5 months of 1972, almost 3,000 such inves-
tigations were made by the 22 line-staff probation counselors of
the intake units.'7 The field division of the probation department,
composed of 18 probation counselors,"6 is responsible for investi-
gating referrals of children already on probation and for filing
probation revocation petitions. A total of 408 revocation petitions
were filed during fiscal year 1971-72. This division is also respon-
sible for the supervision of children previously placed on proba-
tionary status by the court. In April 1972, each field counselor was
supervising an average of 54 probationers.
The director of court services and his assistant manage the
operations of the probation department. Children in Denver's
juvenile justice system, however, rarely see administrators. Their
contact is largely with counselors at the hall if they are detained,
with the probation counselors in any case, and with the judicial
officers if their case is handled by the filing of a petition.
The Denver City and County Building houses the juvenile
court. About 15 minutes away from the city and county building
is juvenile hall, where the intake division of the probation depart-
ment is located. Unit III of the intake division, the screening unit,
is responsible for interviewing all children brought to the hall by
" Ch. 110, § 16, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 390, amending CoLo. Rav. STAT. ANN. §
22-3-1(2)(a) (Supp. 1967), which reads:
Whenever it appears to a law enforcement officer or other person that a child
is, or appears to be, within the court's jurisdiction, as provided in section 22-
1-4(1)(c) [CHINS] or (1)(d) [dependency and neglect], the law enforce-
ment officer or other person may refer the matter to the court, which shall
have a preliminary investigation made to determine whether the interests of
the child or of the community require that further action be taken, which
investigation shall be made by the probation department, county depart-
ment of public welfare, or any other agency designated by the court.
The Denver Department of Welfare investigates possible dependency and neglect cases
and files petitions in this jurisdictional area with the court's authorization.
'1 Line-staff counselors are responsible for the day-to-day handling of cases, whereas
their supervisors generally handle administrative matters and oversee the management
of caseloads. The intake division also includes a director, three supervisory counselors, and
three counselors who deal in the specialized areas of guardianship and delinquency pre-
vention through volunteer services.
"1 The field division also includes a director and four supervisory counselors.
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the police or their parents. Division III of the Denver Juvenile
Court is also located in the administrative wing of this building.
Since 1972, this courtroom has been used on a regular basis for
delinquency and children in need of supervision hearings, in addi-
tion to daily detention hearings. The referees rotate assignment
between divisions III and IV approximately-once a month.
IV. CRITICAL JUNCTURES
A. Characteristics Common to All Critical Junctures
While there are apparent differences among the critical junc-
tures, there are also some common characteristics. All junctures
occur in the Denver Juvenile Court and are presided over by staff
persons of the court. Thus the philosophies, pressures, and vagar-
ies of the court, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of court
personnel, are influencing factors in each juncture. Each of the
junctures takes place in the facilities of the court, and whether
those facilities are cramped or luxurious obviously influences the
behavior of the participants in the decisionmaking process. A
child, moreover, may be placed in or released from detention'9 as
a result of a decision made at any of the junctures. In most instan-
ces, detention decisions are made by judicial officers.
Finally, statutory definitions of delinquent children and chil-
dren in need of supervision are employed at each critical juncture,
although the interpretation imposed in practice varies. The Code
defines delinquent children as follows:
(17)(a)(i) "Delinquent child" means any child ten years of age
or older who, regardless of where the violation occurred, has vio-
lated:
(ii) Any federal or state law, except state traffic and game and
fish laws or regulations;
(iii) Any municipal ordinance, except traffic ordinances, the
penalty for which may be a jail sentence; or
(iv) Any lawful order of the court made under this chapter."
Important exceptions to the above definition are children who,
having been previously adjudicated delinquent, commit an act
11 Detention is defined as secure custody in physically restricting facilities. COLO.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-3(12) (Supp. 1967).
,0 People v. D.R., 29 Colo. App. 525, 487 P.2d 824 (1971), held in essence that a
"lawful order of the court made under this chapter" did not include conditions of proba-
tion imposed as a result of an adjudication that a child was a child in need of supervision,
if violation of the conditions of probation would not in themselves be sufficient to sustain
a delinquency petition.
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which would be a felony if committed by an adult, or who are 14
years or older and commit crimes of violence.'
Children in need of supervision, referred to by judges and
children alike as "CHINS", are defined in the Code as follows:
(18) (a) "Child in need of supervision" means any child:
(b) Who is repeatedly absent from school in violation of the
requirements of Article 20 of Chapter 123, C.R.S. 1963.2
(c) Who has run away from home or is otherwise beyond the
control of his parent, guardian, or other legal custodian; or
(d) Whose behavior or condition is such as to endanger his
own or others' welfare."
B. Referral to the Denver Juvenile Court by Police, Parents, or
School Officials
1. Police Referral
Approximately 1,350 juveniles per month pass through the
Delinquency Control Division (DCD) of the Denver Police De-
partment, some to be sent to juvenile hall and others to be re-
leased to their parents. Typically, DCD will receive a report of
suspicious activity by juveniles. Officers will be sent to the scene
and, after an investigation, will decide whether to take the chil-
dren into custody. If the officers do take the children into custody,
they will be taken to DCD where the arresting officers will at-
tempt to notify the parents and will determine whether there are
any juvenile case histories on the children. The children may then
be interrogated about the alleged offense. On this basis, a DCD
detective will decide the course of action to be taken. In the more
"serious" cases, the children will be transported to juvenile hall
for detention.
The children in this typical situation might also be dealt
with in a number of other ways. The arresting officers will often
lecture the children on the street and then release them, or merely
take them home to their parents, especially if the officers feel that
either the DCD detective or the complaint deputy at the district
"' COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-3(17) (Supp. 1969), as amended, ch. 110, § 1, [1973]
Colo. Sess. Laws 384.
Basically the requirement, with exceptions listed in the statute, is that "[elvery
child who has attained the age of seven years and is under the age of sixteen ... shall
attend public school for at least one hundred seventy-two days during each school year."
CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 123-20-5(1) (1963).
SCOLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-3(18) (Supp. 1967).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
attorney's office will conclude that the offense does not require
the filing of a petition.
Similarly, the officers might choose to take the children
home immediately after they are taken into custody and to leave
with each child and his parents a request to appear at DCD at
some later time for investigation by a detective."' The police offi-
cers might also have contacted the children's parents before
transporting the children to DCD. Officers at DCD have observed
that if the parents are present at DCD during the questioning and
willing to take their children home at that time, the detectives
are much more inclined to release them, especially if the parents
seem able to assert control over their children.
If the parents appear at DCD, they may be asked to partici-
pate in the interrogation. In this case, the children and their
parents will usually be advised of their legal rights.2 5 A statement
of these rights is generally read in a perfunctory manner by the
officer, and the parents and children are then left alone to discuss
the matter. Often the officer suggests that if the children waive
their rights, matters will be facilitated, or states as an induce-
ment that the case is not going to be referred to the court anyway
(a decision which the detective and not the officer makes). If any
child decides voluntarily to speak with the officers, he and his
parent are asked to sign a juvenile advisement form.
2
1
The Code is fairly explicit in its directives to "law enforce-
ment officers." While it does not require that a specific division
be established to deal with juvenile offenders, the Denver Police
Department has nevertheless created one. Any person taken into
custody by a police officer who informs that officer that he is
These requests carry no legal significance as far as most attorneys who practice in
the Denver Juvenile Court are concerned, and any appearance by child or parent is wholly
voluntary on their part. Furthermore, there is no provision in the Colorado Children's
Code for these requests, which have become known as "order-ins."
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Except for discussions of police conduct with regard to the involuntariness of juve-
nile confessions in Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948), and Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S.
49 (1962), the Supreme Court has not dealt with the rights of juveniles in the custody of
the police. Therefore, the legalities of the police relationship with juveniles are determined
by the Colorado Children's Code and the cases decided by the appellate courts of Colo-
rado. Information concerning the guidelines and procedures used by the Delinquency
Control Division of the Denver Police Department was obtained as a result of a lengthy
interview conducted with the chief of the division in August of 1971, and several observa-
tion and interview sessions within the division were conducted during the summer of 1971.
Procedures have not changed appreciably since the dates of those interviews and observa-
tions.
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under 18 years of age, or whom the officer believes to be under
18, is processed through DCD regardless of the nature of the
offense alleged. If an offense is processed through the burglary
division, for instance, and it is later discovered that the person
charged is a juvenile, the case will be transferred to DCD.
Once a child has been taken into custody by a law enforce-
ment officer,27 the Code defines the duties of that officer:
(1) When a child is taken into temporary custody, the officer
shall notify a parent, guardian, or legal custodian without unneces-
sary delay and inform him that, if the child is placed in detention,
all parties have a right to a prompt hearing to determine whether
the child is to be detained further. Such notification may be made
to a person with whom the child is residing if a parent, guardian, or
legal custodian cannot be located ...
(2) The child shall then be released to the care of his parents
or other responsible adult, unless his immediate welfare or the pro-
tection of the community requires that he be detained. The parent
or other person to whom the child is released may be required to sign
a written promise, on forms supplied by the court, to bring the child
to the court at a time set or to be set by the court.
(3) (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection
(3), a child shall not be detained by law enforcement officials any
longer than is reasonably necessary to obtain his name, age, resi-
dence, and other necessary information and to contact his parents,
guardian, or legal custodian.
(b) If he is not thereupon released, as provided in subsection
(2) of this section, he must be taken directly to the court or to the
place of detention or shelter designated by the court without unnec-
essary delay ...
(4) The officer or other person who takes a child to a detention
or shelter facility must notify the court and any agency or persons
so designated by the court at the earliest opportunity that the child
has been taken into custody and where he has been taken. He shall
also file a brief written report promptly with the court and any
agency or person so designated by the court, stating the facts which
led to the child being taken into custody and the reason why the
child was not released.a
Generally, the DCD adheres rigorously to these guidelines.
Upon occasion children have been transported through the city
and interrogated in patrol cars before being taken to DCD, and
" The guidelines for taking into custody are found at COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-1
(Supp. 1967). Discussion of the procedure is not included as part of this study. The phrase
used is "taken into temporary custody" rather than "arrested." Id. § 22-2-1(3) (Supp.
1967).
- Id. §§ 22-2-2(1) to -(4), as amended, ch. 110, § 12, [19731 Colo. Sess. Laws 388.
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there have been isolated cases of police brutality to juveniles
occurring between the time a youngster left DCD with the officers
and his arrival at a hospital or at juvenile hall. These cases have
been extremely rare, however, and have frequently resulted in
massive publicity and investigations of the officers involved.
Yet the good intentions of the officers are unfortunately often
frustrated. Sometimes parents do not receive notification of their
child's detention until long after he reaches juvenile hall. The
most common reason for this delay is that many parents simply
cannot be reached. The Code seems to contemplate that parents
will respond positively when notified that they may meet their
children at DCD. However, one DCD detective has estimated
thatbetween 10 and 25 percent of the children taken to juvenile
hall every month are placed there not because the police feel they
should be detained, but because parents cannot or, more often,
will not take the child home. Needless to say, this parental deci-
sion moves the child forward through the juvenile justice system.
DCD routinely complies with subsection (3) of the above-
quoted Code section. Perhaps the reasons underlying this compli-
ance are that there is no holding facility in the division29 and that
the rate of escape would be even higher than the present rate if
processed children were held in the division. The facilities of DCD
are cramped, and an enormous amount of traffic funnels through
the offices hourly.
Subsection (4) is satisfied by the use of the juvenile case
summary sheet, which is forwarded to juvenile hall if the child is
detained and given to the parent if the child is released.
The interpretation given by the police officers and detectives
to the vague statutory language in subsection (2) requires some
discussion. The statute demands release of the child "unless his
immediate welfare or the protection of the community requires
that he be detained." Although this standard was not mentioned
by the receiving officers interviewed, they did delineate standards
which they utilize for deciding whether to send children to juve-
nile hall. Children on probation or parole are always taken to
juvenile hal130 regardless of the offense alleged or the pattern of
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-3(6) (Supp. 1971) prohibits holding children in the
city jail located on the fourth floor of the same building.
I Police officers and Denver Juvenile Court intake personnel who were interviewed
both admitted that alleged parole violators of any age are generally refused entry at
juvenile hall and are confined in the Denver city or county jail. Some court personnel insist
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previous offenses. Juveniles subject to an order of detention 31 or
a request for apprehension of a runaway child are detained unless
the parent who signed the order or request is prepared to accept
the release of the child from DCD. Finally, the officers and detec-
tives look to the seriousness of the offense as a criterion for deten-
tion. Apparently, each detective's subjective view of what is "se-
rious" guides the decision. Another obvious, though unstated,
factor is the authority and discipline exercised by the child's
parent. Those who are stern with their children or who promise
retribution gain the release of their children more often than
those parents, especially unmarried mothers, who are tearful,
confused, or seemingly lacking in control over their children.
Because the responsibility for filing a "CHINS" petition is
vested in the Denver Juvenile Court (delegated to its probation
department) and because delinquency petitions are filed by the
district attorney's office, the DCD can refer a case or an offense
for filing to the court or to the district attorney. 2 The procedure
is administrative, and is not provided for in the Code. In the case
of every juvenile brought to DCD, a juvenile case summary sheet
is completed by the arresting officer and checked for complete-
ness by the DCD detective or receiving officer. On the basis of this
summary, any interrogation of the child, and the investigation,
the receiving officer must make his decision whether to send a
formal complaint to the court or to the district attorney. In the
case of a "first offender," the officer is given broad discretion by
the division, regardless of the presence of probable cause, in de-
ciding whether to refer the complaint. Two of the detectives inter-
viewed stated that in addition to the referral criteria enumerated
above, they give great consideration to the attitude of the child
in a first arrest situation. One also indicated that if the parent
the decision is discretionary with the Director of Juvenile Hall, while the police maintain
that no alleged parole violator over the age of 16 years is ever accepted for detention at
juvenile hall. It would seem that both the police and the court personnel are operating in
direct contravention of a directive from the Denver Juvenile Court judges dated April 6,
1971, which states that "no juvenile shall be transferred from Juvenile Hall to either City
Jail or County Jail without a written specific order signed by the Court." In addition, the
practice violates COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-2(3)(b) (Supp. 1967), quoted in the text,
and section 22-2-3(6)(a) (Supp. 1971). While the practice could conceivably be justified
in specific cases, the across-the-board policy administered under the discretion of the
Director of Juvenile Hall is certainly questionable.
1' See CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-4 (Supp. 1969) for requirements.
32 Ch. 110, § 15, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 389, amending COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §
22-3-1 (Supp. 1967).
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were "uncooperative" or "cocky," he would file on the child, re-
gardless of the child's attitude. The other detective intimated
that if he felt discipline from the parent was forthcoming, he
would not file, preferring to see the matter handled at home.
Exactly what parental actions the detectives were looking for is
unclear.
On a second-time alleged offense, discretion is removed from
the detectives and, upon a finding of probable cause, the child's
case must automatically be referred to the district attorney re-
gardless of whether the child was convicted of the first alleged
offense. This procedure was justified by the chief of the division
in the following manner: "If we waited for a conviction in the
Denver Juvenile Court, we would never refer anyone for further
action." Cases of children on probation or parole are referred
automatically for further action.
The referral goes initially to a district attorney who works
with the division in making a further determination as to the
existence of probable cause. If the district attorney advises the
officers to pursue the case, the investigation is completed and the
complaint usually reaches the probation department of the court
within 15 to 30 days after the alleged offense.
Whether or not a case will eventually be filed was seen by all
the officers interviewed as having a bearing on whether an advise-
ment of rights should be given to the child and his parents. This
was so even though the decision to refer to the district attorney
in most cases is made following interrogation and is automatic.
One detective said: "Advisement is never made unless there is an
intention to file . . . . You always know if you're going to file."
The detective may know, but the arresting officers, who are gen-
erally responsible for advisement, may not. It was observed that
advisement was also not given if violations of municipal ordi-
nances were alleged, if the interrogation was for the purpose of
"case clearance" or recovery of property, or if the officers felt that
the case would not result in a court hearing even if it were referred
to the district attorney. This final reason probably explained
most adequately why police officers are lax in following the Code
guidelines with regard to advisement. The chief of the division,
for example, estimated that perhaps 1 percent of the cases re-
ferred to Denver Juvenile Court by DCD lead to a formal hear-
ing.3
Ch. 110, § 12, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 388, amending COLO. Rav. STAT. ANN. §
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This selectivity in advisement is practiced in spite of the
Code provision that all statements or admissions of a child con-
cerning acts which would be a crime if committed by an adult
that are obtained in violation of his right to formal advisement
shall be inadmissible in evidence.
34
2. Parental Referral
I've been passed from one court to another. I have no money for
private help. I just want to get her off the streets.
Parent"'
Generally parents refer their children to Denver Juvenile
Court by calling or visiting the intake units of the probation
department. Occasionally, however, a parent will bring his child
directly to juvenile hall. " Parental reasons for referral are varied
and difficult to define.
Some parents use the court or a threat of court action to curb
anticipated misbehavior or minor infractions of parental rules by
their children. This "threat" usage of the court has diminished
over the period of this study, primarily because so many serious
problems are presented that probation counselors give little at-
tention to anticipated or minor misbehavior. 7
22-2-2(3)(c) (Supp. 1971). This section of the Colorado Children's Code goes far beyond
the requirements stated by the United States Supreme Court in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967), which specifically limited the juvenile's right to counsel and right against self-
incrimination to the adjudicatory phase of a delinquency proceeding. Id. at 13 & 31 n.48.
Under the cited section of the Code, Colorado courts have recognized "that the juvenile
is entitled to comparable protection in connection with the waiver of his Fourth Amend-
ment rights." This is so even though the section cited in the text refers specifically to
statements and admissions of the child. People v. Reyes, 174 Colo. 377, 483 P.2d 1342
(1971). See also In re B.M.C., 506 P.2d 409 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973).
4 The Denver Juvenile Court personnel would probably dispute the chief's estimate.
The typical filing rate, according to court statistics, is 53.8 percent of all referrals, though
how many of those filings do actually make it to a formal hearing could not be ascertained
from the court's statistics.
3 Keene, God Bless the Child, CERvi's J., July 5, 1971, at 7.
" If this is the case, the hall will either accept the child for detention, or the parent
and child will be asked to speak immediately with the intake screening counselor on duty
to ascertain what further action is required.
" A former judge in the Denver Juvenile Court describes this change in the court's
function as follows:
[Tihe court was visible. If your child was giving you static, you could
go to court and the court had developed, in my mind, this loathsome image
(a) of being everything to all people, and (b) as the whipping boy for parents
and school teachers and administrators and police and everyone, to
psychologically whip youngsters around to say "you better shape up or you're
going to court .. "
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Some parents refer their children to the Denver Juvenile
Court as a last resort, looking to the court as the ultimate social
agency to deal with family problems. Many of the problems are
real and serious, posing a genuine threat to the health or welfare
of the child or his family. Others reflect the developing life styles
of young people, which although perhaps inimical to parents, do
not result in actual danger or damage to the child, his parents,
or the community. Some parental referrals can also be seen as
conscious or unconscious efforts of the parent to expose his physi-
cal, psychological, or marital problems through the child surro-
gate.
Parental referrals are generally handled as CHINS referrals,
being encompassed within the vague statutory rubric that the
child has "run away from home," "is otherwise beyond the con-
trol of his parent," or his "behavior or condition is such as to
endanger his own or others' welfare." '38 Regardless of the reasons
for parental referrals or their validity, referrals must be consid-
ered by the court. That consideration usually occurs in the con-
text of the next three critical junctures to be discussed.
3. School Referral
The statutory definition of a CHINS includes a child who is
"repeatedly absent from school,"39 presumably without a valid
excuse. The Code thus necessarily involves the court in school
problems. Referrals are generally received by the intake units of
the probation department from a school social worker or assistant
principal. Because the law does not define "repeated" absence,
school officials must use their own discretion in referring children
to the court. If an official allows a problem student to remain
absent continuously, he may never refer a child for court filing.
Other school personnel automatically recommend filing after
seven unexcused absences. Still other cases are referred to the
court only after every effort has been made by school social work-
[flt's this changing public perception of the court that needs more time
to filter through. Because when you take the old conception which I have
described, then you take the conception that I had of the court as a screener,
as a court of last resort, and as a court of law and a court of lawyers, and
with rather substantial diversion-then you can see public impatience with
the court because they saw the court as the club and as the efficient quick
club where kids really were immediately processed and threatened or ban-
ished.
COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-1-3(18)(a), (c), (d) (Supp. 1967).
Id. § 22-1-3(18)(b) (Supp. 1967).
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ers, community agencies, and teachers to work with the children
and their families in altering class schedules and in making coun-
seling services or psychological evaluation available.
Generally, children alleged to have committed truancy viola-
tions are not detained in juvenile hall unless they are subject to
other CHINS or delinquency allegations. Their initial contact
with court personnel is usually an interview with an intake proba-
tion counselor in the presence of the referring school official and
their parents.
It is impossible to determine from present court statistics
how many cases are referred by police, parents, and school per-
sonnel. The police, through the district attorney, undoubtedly
refer the majority, followed by parental referrals and school refer-
rals. The referral is the means by which the child enters into
Denver's juvenile justice system. It assures him, at the least, of
speaking with a probation counselor, at the most, of passage
through the remaining eight critical junctures to receive "help"
from the court.
C. Probation Department Decision to Detain Pending Deten-
tion Hearing:
I try to look at the child and look at the parents, and I see if there
is a possibility that the parents can supervise that child at home
.... I have to feel that the child can be relatively safe staying at
home ... because I think that is where he should be if at all possi-
ble.
Intake Probation Counselor'0
Almost hourly, a patrol car will turn into the alley behind
juvenile hall with a child or two for the admissions office. The
door is locked, and a buzzer must be pushed to notify the coun-
selor that another child is awaiting admission. The child will pass
through the door into a poorly lit office area. Behind a large
counter, a juvenile hall employee waits to get basic information
from the child and to relieve him or her of all valuables. If an
intake screening counselor is not readily available,4 the child will
, During fiscal year 1971-72, 4,739 children were admitted to Denver Juvenile Hall.
The projected figures for the following year suggest that 5,876 will be admitted. On an
average day in 1971-72, 83 youngsters were detained at the hall-some serving time on
the school program, some waiting for court hearings, some waiting for placement in group
homes, and some waiting for their parents to want them home again.
1 Beginning in early 1972, unit III of the intake division of the probation department,
located at juvenile hall, initiated a work schedule which required one counselor from the
unit to be responsible for the screening of children brought to the hall. There is a "screen-
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be placed in a small locked room across from the admissions office
until an interview can be arranged which will aid in determining
whether or not the child will be detained pending a detention
hearing before the court.
Frequently, no explanation of the procedures which are being
followed or what can be expected is given to the child; generally
he has a fairly clear idea why he is where he is, but little insight
into what is coming next. Therefore, when the screening proba-
tion counselor arrives, he may appear to the child as a friend. The
child has just been impersonally treated by police officers or over-
wrought parents and a juvenile hall employee, and anyone who
will talk to him is an improvement. The screening probation
counselor already has obtained some information on the child
from the police summary sheet accompanying him. If the child
is currently on probation or awaiting other court action, the
screening counselor will defer to the counselor already involved.
If the child is new to the court, the screening counselor will make
the detention decision himself.
If the screening counselor determines that the child can be
released, the child will usually wait in the admissions area for his
parent or probation counselor to take him home. He and his par-
ents may be asked to promise to return for further interviews at
a later date. Some children who are not potential runaways are
released to shelter care because of parental refusal to respond or
because of the child's fear of returning home.42 If it is determined
that the child must be held pending a detention hearing, he will
be taken to one of the units upstairs, relieved of his own clothing,
given juvenile hall clothing, and introduced to his "home" and
"roommates" for at least the next 48-hour period.
Although it is not part of the administrative guidelines for
hold or release from juvenile hall, an informal procedure was
noted by a screening counselor:
Now, if they are 16 or over [and on parole], they'll just be taken to
city jail and you won't have to make that decision. You do have to
make the decision to have them go to city jail . . .but that's kind
ing counselor" on duty from 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. daily, including weekends. A child
brought to the hall after 11:00 p.m. would be transferred to a unit upstairs to spend the
night, and would be interviewed the following morning.
11 According to one intake probation counselor who serves as a screening counselor
at least 1 day a week, well over half of the children who are brought to juvenile hall are
released prior to their detention hearings-that is, within 48 hours.
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of a policy, if they are 16 or over and on parole, then they go to city
jail.'
The screening unit is a relatively new administrative innova-
tion in the court." Before its inception, children brought to the
hall were interviewed by a juvenile hall employee and transferred
immediately to units upstairs. The probation counselors had the
authority to release a child prior to his detention hearing, but
because there was no efficient mechanism for contacting the
counselor and because a full unit of intake counselors was not
housed in the hall, release was much less frequent. This resulted
in detention hearing dockets of 10 to 20 children daily and mas-
sive overuse of detention facilities.
The Code does not provide for the establishment of special
screening units, nor does it delineate, except in the most general
language, the criteria to be considered in deciding to detain a
child." It defines detention and shelter care as follows:
(12) "Detention" means the temporary care of a child who
requires secure custody in physically restricting facilities pending
" See discussion in note 30 supra.
" The efficient operation of the juvenile hall screening unit has probably been the
most notable reform effected in Denver Juvenile Court during the period of time covered
by this study. Its purpose and structure were described by the acting assistant director of
court services as follows:
[Tihe unit at the hall was set up so there would be a professional
approach-dialogue-between the child first coming into detention and pro-
fessional decisions being made at that point.
The way it's structured is that when a child is picked up anywhere in
the city, the child will go through the Delinquency Control Division and they
have a receiving officer on duty 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. This receiving
officer makes the initial decision whether the child should be released or
detained.
Once that decision is made, if the decision is made for detention, the
child comes to juvenile hall. Immediately upon the child's arrival, he is
interviewed-screened-by an intake probation officer. This officer has the
final say as to whether the child is to be detained or not, and there are
certainly cases where we don't go along with the police department's recom-
mendation. They might have recommended detention but we might release
the child. So it has to be clear-it is clear-to the police department and the
probation department that the final decision is made by that particular
officer. . . . If the police are saying "hold" and the probation officer is
saying "release", the supervisor is contacted and has to agree with the proba-
tion officer before the child is released.
But see ch. 110, § 12, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 388, amending COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §
22-2-3-(3)(b) (Supp. 1967).
" There are neither United States Supreme Court nor Colorado appellate court deci-
sions with regard to the preadjudicatory phase of detention.
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court disposition or an execution of a court order for placement or
commitment.
(13) "Shelter" means the temporary care of a child in physi-
cally unrestricting facilities pending court disposition or execution
of a court order for placement."
The authority of the intake division of the probation department
to act on detention prior to a detention hearing is apparently
derived, as a delegated responsibility, from the following Code
section:
(4) The court may at any time order the release of any child,
except children being held pursuant to paragraphs (b) and (c) of
subsection (3) of this section, from detention or shelter care without
holding a hearing, either without restriction or upon written promise
of the parent, guardian, or legal custodian to bring the child to the
court at a time set or to be set by the court.47
The Code requires the use of shelter care rather than detention
where appropriate, but it does not require that a hearing be held
to determine its necessity." Presumably, the authority to release
a child to shelter care has also been delegated to probation coun-
selors by the court, although shelter is not mentioned in the
court's administrative guidelines reprinted below. 9
The only other official guidelines on detention standards are
found in the Colorado Rules of Juvenile Procedure. Rule 58(a)
uses as a standard the child's "immediate welfare or the protec-
tion of the community," while the comparable language of Rule
59(a) is "the child's best interest or that of the community." 5
The court has interpreted these broad statutory guidelines
and has formulated a court policy on hold or release from juvenile
hall. Its policy statement was written by the director of field
services and the acting director of intake with the help of their
staff supervisors, and reads as follows:
I. Discretion To Release:
A. When any child is brought to Juvenile Hall to be detained,
" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-1-3(12), (13) (Supp. 1967).
- Ch. 110, § 14, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 389, amending COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
22-2-3(4) (Supp. 1967).
4' COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-3(1) (Supp. 1967).
41 One reason for this omission may be the crucial lack of shelter facilities available
to the Denver Juvenile Court and the presumption, probably legitimate, that the agency
charged with the responsibility of establishing and making available to the court adequate
shelter care would respond more quickly to an order for shelter placement by the court
than a request for it by a screening counselor.
0 COLO. R. Juv. P. 58(a), 59(a).
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the proper probation officer, Intake or Field, will make the final
determination on the Hold or Release of the juvenile.
II. Reasons For Holding a Child:
A. Unless otherwise committed to a probation program, or
ordered by the Court, no child should be detained in Juvenile Hall,
unless the child is a danger to himself or to the community.
B. A child is not to be held in Juvenile Hall merely as a disci-
plinary measure.
C. A child is not to be held in Juvenile Hall merely for investi-
gation. If investigation of unsolved complaints becomes a factor in
danger to self or community, the probation officer should take this
into careful consideration.
E. A child should be held if there is strong evidence he is a
danger to himself or the community even though that danger is not
at the moment completely established.
1. Danger to self or community must be established by
taking into consideration all involved factors - probable cause,
seriousness of alleged offense, pending court action, past be-
havior pattern, social and psychological history, and knowl-
edge of home and community environments.
The discretion allowed a probation officer in deciding to re-
lease a child varies depending on the DCD's request to hold or
release. If the DCD wishes the child to be held, the proper super-
visor or director must approve the child's release, unless the po-
lice hold was requested because the child is alleged to have com-
mitted a delinquent act which would constitute a felony if com-
mitted by an adult, in which case the child must be held for a
detention hearing. 1 Before a release is permitted, a conference
between the probation counselor and the child must take place.
If a decision cannot be reached, the child is held pending a final
decision by the director. If the DCD indicates that the child may
be released, the probation counselor has full discretion over the
detention decision.
After the above guidelines had been promulgated, structured
interviews were conducted with probation counselors to deter-
mine their own practices. The counselors were asked what criteria
were used in the decision to hold or release and were asked
whether the decision was theirs alone to make. Most of those
interviewed were familiar with the guidelines but had embel-
lished and interpreted them substantially to reflect their own




philosophies and experiences. Many of these embellishments are
consistent with the statutory requirement of detention where the
child's "immediate welfare or the protection of the community"
can be served." Certainly repeated runaways, users of hard drugs,
and juveniles whose conduct suggests the probability that they
will commit further similar offenses might reasonably be de-
tained under this standard. However, detaining a child for the
purpose of forcing parental involvement in a treatment plan or of
gathering investigative information, as one intake screening
counselor suggested, would seem to be only indirectly related to
the best interests of the child. Surely, a recommendation of de-
tention because shelter care or other alternative holding facilities
are unavailable is not acceptable.
All of the line-staff probation counselors questioned indi-
cated that, in most cases, they would not ask that a child be
detained unless a formal petition on the alleged offense was going
to be filed. The acting assistant director of court services, how-
ever, did not feel this was an absolute requirement. In spite of the
guidelines promulgated by the court administrators, the counsel-
ors felt the detention decision was theirs alone to make in the first
instance. One suggested conferring with the supervisor only for
the sake of communication, another, with DCD for informational
purposes.
The decision to release a child is obviously not reviewed by
the court since the child will not appear for a detention hearing.
Nor can it be assumed that the decision is reviewed by a supervis-
ing probation counselor. On the other hand, if the decision is
made to detain the youngster, that decision will be reviewed by
the court within 48 hours.0
D. Detention Hearing
Effective Monday, December 13, 1971, members of the Court
Intake Staff will advise all children detained at Juvenile Hall of
their right to an attorney and a list will be compiled daily of the
children on the Detention Docket who desire attorneys. This list will
be available to the Public Defenders and Legal Aid Attorneys at the
Admitting Office. The children will be brought from the units to be
interviewed by the attorneys in the interviewing rooms across from
the Admitting Office."
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-2(2) (Supp. 1967).
5 Id. § 22-2-3(2) (Supp. 1971).
5 Memorandum to Public Defenders and Legal Aid Attorneys from the Presiding
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The referee who sits at juvenile hall in Division Ill of the
Denver Juvenile Court averages eight to nine detention hearings
an afternoon, Monday through Friday. Until the establishment of
the intake screening unit at the hall, hearings were often held for
as many as 20 youngsters in a single day. Most children are now
represented by counsel, and a representative of the district attor-
ney's office attends all hearings, arguing vigorously for detention
in many of the more serious delinquency allegation cases and
taking no role whatsoever in most CHINS cases.
The child who is detained as a result of his interview with a
probation counselor often waits in an upstairs living unit at
juvenile hall for at least one full day following the interview. On
the day of his scheduled detention hearing, he will be brought to
the lobby area of the visiting or interviewing rooms across from
the admitting office. The child may or may not have been advised
as to the purpose of this removal. Generally, promptly at 1 p.m.,
a representative of the public defender's office and a student
attorney from the University of Denver's Clinical Legal Educa-
tion Program will arrive, detention docket in hand.
The child may be impressed by the youth and the rather
"hip" appearance of his attorney. Most are in their twenties,
many are women, and all have a casual attitude with regard to
their own and the court's status as authority figures. The attor-
neys, on the whole, show concern for helping the child to under-
stand what is going to happen in the detention hearing, and most
of the children readily choose to be represented. Those who are
unsure or unconcerned about being represented are generally rep-
resented anyway.
When the attorney tells the child that the purpose of the
detention hearing is to determine whether he is going to remain
at juvenile hall, return home, or go to a welfare shelter placement,
the child, when asked, will almost always respond that he wants
to go home. In the rare case where the child may fear abuse at
home, he will select the protective closed environment of juvenile
hall. Even though the majority of the children interviewed had
been represented by counsel before, most seemed genuinely sur-
prised that anyone cared about their feelings.
Judge of Denver Juvenile Court, Dec. 9, 1971. The memorandum is court policy only and
is not drawn from the Children's Code which requires only that children and parents be
advised of the child's right to counsel "at his first appearance before the court." COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-6(1)(a) (Supp. 1967).
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The typical attorney-child interview lasts for 5 to 15 minutes,
although often the attorney is able to speak with the child imme-
diately before the hearing to tell him whether his parents are
present and whether the child's assessment of their willingness to
take him home is correct. After all of the children have been
interviewed, they are escorted upstairs through many corridors
and locked doors. The children are then moved downstairs in the
other wing of the building where they sit in a cramped stairwell
to await being called by the sheriff, who attends all detention
hearings."
When each child's name is called, the locked door to the
stairwell opens, and the child is led by the sheriff across a hall to
the courtroom. The child's attorney either is sitting at defense
counsel table or meets him in the hall. The parents of the child,
who have been waiting near the courtroom in a lobby area, are
now called and join the child and his attorney at counsel table.
This is often the first time that the child and his parents have
seen each other in 2 days.
After questioning counsel about his or her willingness to pro-
ceed before a referee"6 and to waive formal advisement of the
child's rights,"7 the referee will ask the probation counselor to
proceed. In almost all cases, the probation counselor is the same
person who made the initial decision to detain the child. He will
relate why the child is before the court, often stating as fact the
alleged offense. The counselor's information is derived from the
police summary sheet, past court records of the child, and inter-
views with the child and his parent. On the basis of this informa-
tion, the probation counselor makes a recommendation as to de-
tention or release. After this presentation, the child's attorney is
permitted to question the counselor about the statements made
or about omissions in the presentation. In addition, the referee
and opposing counsel may question the probation counselor
about his recommendation. Experienced probation counselors are
careful to recite the alternative litanies that the child is "a danger
"' The sheriff has become a permanent fixture at detention hearings because of the
large number of children who have escaped by running down the carpeted hall about 20
feet to an open door used by the general public as the entrance to the courtroom area. In
fiscal year 1971-72, 76 children were "AWOL" from juvenile hall, a decrease of 22 from
the previous year.
-1 Ch. 110, § 6, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 386, amending COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-
1-10(3) (Supp. 1967).
" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-6(1)(a) (Supp. 1967).
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to himself or the community" or that his detention or release is
"in his best interest or in the best interest of the community."
With newer counselors, however, the referee may have to con-
sciously lead the presentation so that the counselor ends by artic-
ulating these statutory standards for detention.
The evidentiary rules applicable to detention hearings are
informal. Witnesses are rarely sworn, opinion testimony and
hearsay are widespread, and probation counselors often urge as
the basis for detention the commission of offenses by a child
which have not been admitted or proved. Repeated objections by
attorneys are frowned upon by the court.
After the counselor's presentation is completed, the attorney
for the child will present the child's case. Usually this consists of
either relating or having the child relate what he wants to do,
arguing that the child's situation does not fall within the parame-
ters of the standards for detention, and possibly enlisting the
support of the parent for the child's viewpoint. If the parent's
view is contrary to the child's wishes, the attorney will at least
make the parent's view clear to the court and then attack it. The
attorney for the child will also suggest the alternative shelter
replacement if it is appropriate and desired by the child. The
referee may question the child or the attorney following this pres-
entation. In addition, the court will usually ask the parents how
they feel about the situation.
If serious allegations of delinquency are at issue, the repre-
sentative of the district attorney's office may then present the
case for the "prosecution." If the counselor is recommending re-
lease, some elements of a contested hearing may ensue, and the
representative may choose to cross-examine any of the persons
who testified. It must be remembered that the district attorney's
representative generally has available for review only that infor-
mation which has been developed in the hearing and additional
reports from the files of the police department or district attor-
ney. Rarely has this representative interviewed either the child or
the child's parents.
After listening to these arguments, the referee will make
findings and will recommend further detention, shelter place-
ment, or release to the parents. The recommendation may be
followed by emotional appeals from the parents or child or by an
oral request on the record from counsel for the child for a rehear-
ing before a judge.
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If the child is released to his parents, they may leave the hall
within approximately one-half hour, possibly with orders to re-
turn to speak further with a probation counselor about contem-
plated court action. If a shelter placement is ordered for the child,
the probation counselor is charged with the duty of contacting the
Denver Department of Welfare to request that a child welfare
worker transport the child from juvenile hall to the shelter facil-
ity.5 8 This will occur 2 hours to 2 days following the court's recom-
mendation, during which time, of course, the child remains in
detention. Probation counselors are not authorized by the welfare
department to place the child in a shelter facility.
If further detention is recommended for the child, he will be
returned to his detention unit. This recommendation may be re-
viewed by a judge and can be re-evaluated at any of the later
critical junctures. During detention, psychological and medical
evaluations of the child may be performed, and the probation
counselor will probably visit with him again. However, the child
will receive no counseling or treatment, except for the limited
amount provided by the unit counselors. A detained child may
understandably become depressed following the detention hear-
ing since the average length of stay in Denver's Juvenile Hall in
1971 was 28.7 days.
The provisions of the Code and the Colorado Rules of Juve-
nile Procedure which deal specifically with the detention hearing
are sparse. As a result, an administrative overlay has been devel-
oped. But because the detention hearing is the child's first ap-
pearance before the court, it may be instructive to examine the
provisions of the Code dealing with court hearings generally.
The Code provides that upon a first appearance before the
court, the child and his legal custodian are to be fully advised of
their constitutional and legal rights, including the right to a jury
trial and the right to be represented by counsel.59 It would seem
5 Presently there is one shelter facility for girls available to the court and one for
boys, so this argument for shelter placement may in many cases be futile. The standard
for detention is so vague that almost any behavior can be said to fulfill it, and often does,
when there are no placements available in shelter care. In recent months the court has
shown decreasing reticence in ordering the placement despite the absence of shelter place-
ments. Only upon occasion will it force the Denver Department of Welfare, to whom the
court has delegated the responsibility for the establishment of shelter facilities, to bear
the burden of finding some nonrestrictive placement or risk being held in contempt of
court.
" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-6(1)(a) (Supp. 1967). Subsection (b) provides for
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that the rights accorded juveniles as a result of United States
Supreme Court decisions should therefore be explained to the
child at his first appearance before the court. Those rights include
timely written notice to parents and child of the specific charge
and factual allegations to be considered at any adjudicatory hear-
ing,'" retained or appointed counsel for the child in that hearing,"'
the privilege against self-incrimination,62 confrontation and cross-
examination of witnesses against the child," and the right to have
the allegations in the adjudicatory hearing proved beyond a rea-
sonable doubt."
These constitutional rights, as well as the right under the
Code to a jury trial, apply only to an adjudicatory hearing. Conse-
quently, referees rarely advise the child and his parents of them
at the detention hearing. In practice, this is of little significance
since in most cases a petition, even if contemplated, has not as
yet been filed, and under Gault, the court has the responsibility
of again advising the child prior to both the plea and the adjudi-
catory hearings.
Inasmuch as detention hearings are generally held before a
referee, the child and his parents should also be advised of the
child's right to a hearing before a judge in the first instance, 5 of
the effect of the recommendation of the referee,66 and, following
the findings and recommendations of the referee, of the right of
the parties to a rehearing before a judge if requested within 5
days. 7
court-appointed counsel if the family "requests an attorney and is found to be without
sufficient financial means." Id. §3 22-1.6(4)(i), (ii) provide for a "trial by a jury of not
more than six."
" In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967). See also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3-2(2)(a)
to -3(1) (Supp. 1967); COLO. R. Juv. P. 12-14.
6, 387 U.S. at 41. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-6 (Supp. 1969).
'2 Ch. 110, § 12, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 388, amending COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
2 2 -2 -2(3)(c) (Supp. 1971) applies to interrogation by police officers if the information
garnered is to be used in trial against the child; however, no provision was found which
provided that the court must advise the child of this right at any hearing.
63 387 U.S. at 57. While the Colorado Children's Code provides in sections 22-1-
8(2), (3) for the cross-examination of persons who have submitted reports upon which the
disposition of the child's case may be based, it does not expressly provide for the confron-
tation and cross-examination of witnesses at the adjudicatory hearing, apparently relying
on the mandate of Gault.
6 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1969); CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-6(1) (Supp. 1969).
" Ch. 110, § 6, [19731 Colo. Sess. Laws 386, amending COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-
1-10(3) (Supp. 1967).




If a formal advisement is given by the court at the detention
hearing, it generally includes discussion only of the child's right
to a hearing before a judge in the first instance, of the right to
counsel at every stage of the proceedings, and of the privilege
against self-incrimination in the detention hearing. Rarely is the
child or parent advised of the child's right to a rehearing before
a judge if they dispute the recommendations of the referee.
Other provisions of the Code also apply specifically to deten-
tion hearings. "[T]emporary care in a shelter facility designated
by the court or the county department of public welfare" is re-
quired for those children who must be taken from home but do
not require physical restriction.6 Such children should not be
placed in detention." However, all children taken into custody by
the police and not released to their parents are in fact placed in
Denver's Juvenile Hall at least temporarily, since the police offi-
cers are not permitted by the Denver Department of Welfare to
take such children directly to a shelter facility.
Some provisions of the Code are applicable to all hearings in
Juvenile Court. The Colorado Rules of Juvenile Procedure gov-
ern,70 hearings "may be conducted in an informal manner,"7' the
general public is not excluded unless the court determines such
exclusion is in the best interest of the child,72 a verbatim record
is required in all hearings unless waived,7 3 and publicity including
names or pictures of the parties is forbidden unless specifically
ordered by the court.74
Generally these provisions, as well as those referring specifi-
cally to detention hearings, are well followed by the court. Yet in
some instances, the administrative overlay of court structure and
procedure has the effect of abridging or nullifying many of the
rights included in the formal law. For example, all detention
hearing proceedings are recorded by tape recorder, as mandated,
" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-3(l); Id. §§ 22-1-3(12) - (13) (Supp. 1967).
" Ch. 110, § 13, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 389, amending CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §
22-2-3(3) (Supp. 1967). COLO. R. Juv. P. 59 is more explicit in its guidelines for detention,
stating that "[i]f the court finds release will not be contrary to the child's best interest
or that of the community it shall release the child to the custody of its parents or other
responsible adult."
7o CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-7(1)(a) (Supp. 1967).
Id. § 22-1-7(I)(b) (Supp. 1969).
72 Id.
71 Id. § 22-1-7(2) (Supp. 1967).
1, Id. § 22-1-7(5)(a) (Supp. 1967).
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and the tapes retained in the court clerk's office. However, even
if counsel immediately files a request for a rehearing of the ref-
eree's detention decision, it is often at least 5 days before the
judge receives the request, locates and listens to the tape, and is
prepared for the rehearing. If the child has been detained, the
judge's subsequent decision to release the child benefits him only
after 5 to 10 days of detention, and the child's right to a redeter-
mination of the referee's detention decision thus becomes less
meaningful.
Similarily, although hearings "may be conducted in an infor-
mal manner," 5 the detention hearing is the only type of hearing
conducted in the court in which informality is peculiarly pro-
nounced. Although the injustice which may result to the child is
only further detention, and neither commitment nor branding as
a delinquent, the following section of the Gault decision is apro-
pos:
[Tihere is increasing evidence that the informal procedures, con-
trary to the original expectation may themselves constitute a further
obstacle to effective treatment of the delinquent to the extent that
they engender in the child a sense of injustice provoked by seemingly
all-powerful and challengeless exercise of authority by judges and
probation officers.7"
The brief description of a typical detention hearing con-
tained in the first part of this section gives some indication of the
confused and confusing nature of the hearings in division In of
the court. Because the child is usually represented by an attor-
ney, the allegations and authority of the probation counselor and
the court may not go totally unchallenged. However, because the
informality of the hearing is so extreme, and because those in-
volved generally have only limited information to work with, it
may often seem to the child that the recommendations of the
probation counselor are always followed by the referee, and the
objections of counsel regarding gross hearsay and opinion evi-
dence always ignored. As presently conducted, a detention hear-
ing is an ill-defined hybrid governed only minimally by the formal
law. It is too formal in some respects, devastatingly informal in
others; sometimes evidentiary, other times oblivious of the rules
of evidence; adversary as to participants involved, nonadversary
75 Id. § 22-1-7(1)(b) (Supp. 1969).
7' In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26n.37, citing from PAESIDENr's COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCE-
MENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIEY' (1967).
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as to the conduct of the hearings; governed by a statutory stan-
dard and theoretically limited in scope, but far reaching in prac-
tice on account of the hopelessly broad and vague terms of that
statutory standard. Influencing every detention hearing is the
lack of placement alternatives other than detention and the lack
of treatment alternatives within the detention placement.
A further problem regarding the fairness of the detention
hearing arises from the role that the probation counselor is forced
to play. Because the representative of the district attorney's office
is rarely prepared to argue for or against detention, the counselor
often appears to the child to be the prosecutor, especially since a
determination to release the child would usually have been made
prior to the detention hearing.
Most probation counselors are uncomfortable with their role
as untrained legal adversaries of the child's attorney, but they
believe that making recommendations about a child's detention
or release is their responsibility. Whatever negative impressions
are left with the child as a result of his perception of the probation
counselor as prosecutor can be mitigated, they argue, by estab-
lishing the limits of the counselor-child relationship at an early
stage. Rejected by each counselor interviewed as both deceptive
and inefficient was the suggestion that a hearing officer, who
could relate to the court the probation counselor's recommenda-
tions regarding detention, might serve to insulate the counselor
from the negative reactions of his probationers.
The Code provides that "[n]othing in this section shall be
construed as denying a child the right to bail."77 This broad state-
ment is the only reference in the formal law to the right to bail
and must be read together with the vague standards for detention
or release of the child. A conflict arises because a child who must
be detained for his own welfare still has the right of bail, and if
bond is posted, the child's welfare or best interest may be jeop-
ardized. The court's solution has been to detain on the statutory
authority and, if the setting of bail is requested, to set such an
excessive amount that as a practical matter the child cannot be
released. This practice is especially common in CHINS cases. Its
" COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-3(7) (Supp. 1967).
," COLO. R. Juv. P. 59(c) states that "[ilf the court believes that release will be
contrary to the welfare of the child or the community, the court may order further deten-
tion and shall support such order with appropriate findings of fact, subject, however, to
the right of the child to bail."
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effect is to abrogate the child's right to bail, which the Supreme
Court has defined as intended only to assure the presence of the
accused at further court hearings.79 Also, because the formal law
and the Colorado Rules of Juvenile Procedure provide no stan-
dards for ascertaining the amount of bail calculated to meet this
purpose, the court rarely inquires as to the financial status of the
child or parent, previous appearances or lack of appearance at
court hearings following release, and other factors relevant to
fixing the amount of bail. In fact, one referee in the court, in
response to counsel's argument for reduction of bail, stated that
standards set by the United States Supreme Court did not
apply."o
A final problem in the area of detention is the absence of a
time limit for the filing of a petition against the child. The Code
provides that "[n]o child shall be held in a detention or shelter
facility longer than forty-eight hours . . . unless a petition has
been filed, or the court determines that it would be contrary to
the welfare of the child or of the community to release the child
from detention."'" The court has utilized the latter basis for de-
taining children longer than 48 hours and has been generally
diligent in bringing children before the court for detention hear-
ings within the time limit. However, once it is determined that a
child must be detained, there is no further time period imposed
by law within which a petition must be filed. 2 In practice, the
filing often takes as long as 10 days, and it is even longer until
the plea hearing is held. The child's detention is not automati-
cally reviewed by the court until 10 days after the detention hear-
ing," and even then there is no remedy for the child unless coun-
sel can convince the court to order filing or release within a speci-
fied period of time.
" Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951).
" The presiding judge in the same case had initially set bail at $3,000, and then, upon
advice from his clerk that perhaps it would be met, raised it to $5,000 and finally to
$10,000, all without questioning the child or her parents. The girl was alleged to have run
away from home.
81 Ch. 110, § 13, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 389, amending COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
22-2-3(3) (Supp. 1967).
92 Id.
1 This 10-day review of detention is merely an administrative practice of the Denver
Juvenile Hall, established following complaints of defense attorneys that children were
getting "lost" up in the living units and many times continued to be detained even after
the probation counselor had decided to file a formal petition.
1974
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The child detained following the detention hearing by then
probably feels inexorably bound into the juvenile justice system.
The child who is released to his parents or to a shelter facility may
be just as involved, but the indices of freedom still exist for him.
The decision of the probation department to file a formal peti-
tion, handle informally, or handle unofficially probably has the
greatest impact on whether the released child is to be exposed to
the entire system.4
Meanwhile, the child detained in the living units of Denver
Juvenile Hall waits-for a visit from his family or lawyer, for his
next court appearance, for a chance to escape.
E. Probation Department Decision to File a Petition, Handle
Informally, or Handle Unofficiallys5
8, See note 85 infra regarding the filing decision.
6 Intense interagency squabbling concerning the discretionary power vested by the
Denver Juvenile Court in its probation department to file formal petitions or handle cases
informally or unofficially resulted in some of the most sweeping amendments made to the
Colorado Children's Code in 1973. The process described in this critical juncture describes
the procedures prior to the enactment of the amendments. Those supporting the amend-
ments argued that if there is probable cause to believe a child was involved in a delinquent
offense, the case should be brought under the jurisdiction of the court, and special consid-
eration for the child because of family background, emotional problems, or educational
or cultural deficiencies should be accorded, if at all, at the dispositional stage of the
proceedings, and should not be used as a tactic to keep the child out of the system
altogether.
In delinquency cases only, the new provisions designate the district attorney's office
as the only agency charged initially with determining "whether the interests of the child
or of the community require that further action be taken." Ch. 110, § 15, [1973] Colo.
Sess. Laws 389, amending COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-1(1) (Supp. 1967). The require-
ment for a preliminary investigation in cases of suspected delinquency offenses is re-
moved, and the district attorney's office, presumably relying only upon the seriousness of
the offense, whether probable cause exists to believe the child committed the offense, and
on the extent of the child's police record, is given the power to file delinquency petitions
"which shall be accepted by thw court." Ch. 110, § 15, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 390,
amending COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-1(1) (Supp. 1967). The court no longer has the
discretion to refuse to authorize petitions. If the district attorney's office is unable to
determine whether further action should be taken, the case may be referred to the proba-
tion department for a determination regarding filing following a preliminary investigation.
Ch. 110, § 15, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 390, amending COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-1(1)
(Supp. 1967).
Finally, subsection (d) gives the juvenile court permission to "conduct a preliminary
hearing to determine if there is probable cause to believe that the facts alleged in the
petition bring the child within the court's jurisdiction." Ch. 110, § 15, [1973] Colo. Sess.
Laws 390, amending COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-1(1) (Supp. 1967). The final subsection
was added in anticipation of the argument that alleged delinquents might well suffer a
denial of equal protection in that adults charged with criminal offenses are brought before
the court by direct information, filed by leave of court, by grand jury indictment, or have
the right to a preliminary hearing to protect them from the possible tyranny of an overzeal-
VOL. 51
PRACTICES OF DENVER JUVENILE COURT
Do the findings of the above investigation indicate that it is neces-
sary for the court to take a strong course of action through the filing
of a petition which would enforce a program leading to the rehabili-
tation of the child? If not, what resources in the life of the child are
available (both in his family and in the community) to help him
again attain a path of productivity in his life?"
The probation department's decision to file a petition, han-
dle a case by means of "informal adjustment," or dispense with
the case "unofficially" is based on a "discretionary filing" proce-
dure. Nowhere within the juvenile court system does a probation
counselor's absolute discretion have such far-reaching effects.
Through his filing decision, the counselor either prevents a child
from having further court contact or thrusts him into an intimate
and complete involvement with formal court procedures and de-
cisions.
The counselor's choice of whether or not to file is based on a
preliminary investigation. 7 This investigation is initiated follow-
ing receipt of either a police complaint certified for probable
cause by the district attorney's office or, in the case of CHINS, a
verbal complaint lodged by a parent or school official. Receipt of
a police complaint can take from two days to two weeks or more
from the time the child was taken into custody, depending on the
speed of any DCD investigation conducted.
The counselor's interview with the parents and child is
usually the first step in the preliminary investigation of which the
child becomes aware. No such interviews were observed by the
researchers, but according to the children interviewed, the child
may or may not be advised of his rights, especially the rights
ous district attorney. It is possible that this argument could still be made since the
preliminary hearing provided is discretionary with the juvenile court.
The practical effect of these amendments has been minimal thus far. While an initial
determination to file or to handle informally or unofficially is made by the district attor-
ney's complaint deputy, the cases still are sent to the probation department for a prelimi-
nary investigation and a recommendation. If the probation counselor's decision based
upon the preliminary investigation is different from that of the district attorney, a supervi-
sory counselor "negotiates" with the district attorney to present the department's view.
The final decision of the district attorney, however, prevails under the new amendments.
" Taken from a preliminary draft of INTAKE Dtv., PROBATION DEP"T, DENVER JUVENILE
COURT, CarrERU FOR FMNG PrmTONS (1972), which is destined to become part of an
INTAKE PROCEDURES MANUAL for the court.
" For purposes of this section of the study, the practical effect on a child and his
family of a police referral will be discussed. Referrals from parents or schools are processed
in essentially the same fashion although of course there is no police investigation or
certification of probable cause by the district attorney's office, and thus the case can be
processed more expeditiously.
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against self-incrimination, to have an attorney present, and to
have the charges proved against him beyond a reasonable doubt.8
The child and his parents may expect a broad discussion of
the alleged offense, the child's involvement, the damage to prop-
erty or harm to persons, and the degree of restitution possible if
the child was indeed involved. While the interview does include
these considerations, its major thrust is an effort to determine the
educational, emotional, legal, and familial strengths and weak-
nesses of the child and his family. Children may be surprised to
learn that the probation counselor, in most cases, presumes their
participation in the alleged offense, and instead focuses
discussion on school performance, relationships with parents and
peers, runaway patterns, drug use, and what the children think
about themselves and their lives.
In some cases, a child may learn of the counselor's decision
at the end of this interview. If no further preliminary investiga-
tion is necessary, the counselor may choose to handle the case
"unofficially" and merely to lecture and release the child. The
child and his parents may be reprimanded or reassured, but they
will not be requested to sign documents or to do anything further.
Most children involved in Denver's Juvenile Court system
are familiar with this process. Although the counselor may sug-
gest rehabilitative steps, such as family counseling, recreational
programs, change in school program, or informal supervision by
the probation counselor, and may even make a referral, the coun-
selor's suggestions are neither mandatory nor enforceable.88 Once
" Neither the Colorado Children's Code nor United States Supreme Court cases
require advisement by probation counselors making the filing decision, although most
counselors interviewed stated they did advise children of their rights during the interview.
The danger of a lack of advisement and general lack of formality in the interview with
the probation counselor would appear to be primarily psychological. If the child admits
participation in the alleged offense to the counselor in the presence of his parents, it is
much easier for that child to agree to admit to the allegations in a formal courtroom setting
or in later interrogation sessions with police officers-even if a full advisement is given at
the later session. The problem is, of course, that absent competent legal counseling, the
child and his parents do not know whether the level of participation in the offense is
sufficient to sustain the charges. As stated previously, most children in the Denver Juve-
nile Court are represented by counsel and it must be hoped that the input of counsel for
the child prior to the plea hearing is sufficient to overcome any psychological propensity
for admission resulting from prior uninformed admissions to the probation counselor.
"' The Denver Juvenile Court separates statistically those children "merely" lectured
and released, those referred to other community agencies, and those offered limited super-
vision by the counselor. However, both practically and legally, the child has been handled
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a case is handled unofficially, the child's involvement with the
court is ended.
In some instances a counselor will determine that an "infor-
mal adjustment" is the most appropriate manner of handling a
case." The purpose of informal adjustment is to provide informal
supervision for the child and counseling for the family. These
rehabilitative steps cannot exceed 6 months and are usually over-
seen by a field probation counselor or "Partner."'"
The informal adjustment is a slightly more formalized proce-
dure than unofficial handling, and parents and child must be
advised of their legal rights.2 Both must sign an "Informal Ad-
justment Petition," consenting to the processing of the case in
this manner, and the child must admit enough facts to establish
prima facie jurisdiction. Counseling and visits are not manda-
tory, though it is doubtful that most parents and children under-
stand this. Most children on informal adjustment status who
were interviewed felt they were on probation. Some did not know
what their status was. To the parents and children involved, in-
formal adjustment in most instances must seem identical to a
lecture-and-release procedure, except that they have to "sign
something." This is especially true if, as in many cases, the infor-
unofficially pursuant to COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-1(2)(b) (Supp. 1967). Whether
parents and child realize that there is no legal obligation upon them to participate in the
suggested counseling is open to question.
0 Informal adjustment is appropriate only for those children who have not already
been placed on formal probation by the court.
" The "Partners" organization is for the most part privately funded and has as its
purpose one-to-one counseling of children who are involved to any degree with the Denver
Juvenile Court, or children who, because of demonstrated problems at home, in school,
or in the community, are likely to become so involved. The "senior" partners are lay
volunteers from the community who receive training and guidance from the organization
in counseling and working with troubled children, the "junior" partners.
In 1972, as a result of a grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration,
the organization began to accept as junior partners children placed on informal adjust-
ment by the court. Referral of such children is made by a liaison officer in the intake
division of the probation department, and reports from the senior partner as to the effec-
tiveness of the "partnership" may be transmitted to the court. Junior and senior partners
agree to spend at least 3 hours a week together. The organization provides opportunities,
particularly in the area of recreation, for the partners to engage in at minimal or no cost.
It is enormously successful in Denver, and children referred to Partners for informal
adjustment are much more likely to receive a substantial counseling input than those
referred to field probation counselors who are already overburdened with caseloads of 40
to 50 or more children who have been placed on formal probation. The commitment of a
senior partner is for at least a 9-month period.




mal supervision does not begin until well into the 6-month period.
If a Partner has been assigned, the contact may not begin any
sooner, but at least it is more constant and continuous. Again the
family's involvement with the court is essentially over, except for
limited contacts which may be made over a 3-month period, un-
less another parental, school, or police referral is received by the
probation department.
The final option open to a probation counselor is the filing
of a formal petition. When this option is pursued, the preliminary
investigation is usually more complete, if only because the court
and the defense counsel will scrutinize the petition's validity. The
decision to file a formal petition also requires more extensive
paperwork, arrangements for court filing and service, and court
appearances for the probation counselor. Unofficial treatment of
cases requires less work and such decisions are never reviewed.
The counselor will explain his decision to file a petition to the
parents and the child in an interview with the family. Generally
during this interview, which is probably at least the second, the
counselor will present a copy of the petition to the child and
parents. The allegations are usually written in legalistic terminol-
ogy and probation counselors feel they are under some obligation
to clarify them as well as to advise the family of their legal rights,
especially the right to be represented by counsel. Some probation
counselors automatically refer the family to the public defender's
office for legal representation. In spite of the probation officer's
attempt to explain the petition, few parents of children seemed
to comprehend it.
If the petition has been filed and the plea hearing set, many
counselors will "serve" a copy of the petition and summons dur-
ing the interview, or if the hearing has not been set, request a
waiver of service to be signed by the parents. 3 The parents can
then be notified by phone of the date, time, and place of the
hearing and will receive a copy of the summons and petition at
the plea hearing."
,3 If the petition involved is a Child in Need of Supervision petition, the parents may
also be required to sign the petition as petitioner. If the CHINS petition alleges truancy,
a school social worker may be present at the interview, and in any case will be required
to sign as petitioner.
11 The illegality of such a procedure is obvious. First, under the Colorado Rules of
Civil Procedure, service is to be completed by a person who is not interested in the action;
a probation counselor who is often the petitioner can hardly be said to fall into the category
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Once the probation counselor has opted for the decision of
filing a formal petition, the child is projected into a very formal
court system, at least in the Denver Juvenile Court. His next
contact will be the plea hearing which is set one to two weeks after
the petition is filed with the court. For the child in detention, this
means more time waiting in Juvenile Hall; for the child at home,
it means at least a week or two more of freedom. For both, the
process is just beginning."
The vagueness of the probation department's decisions to file
a petition, handle informally, or handle unofficially can be justi-
fied to some extent by the broadness of the statutory standards
guiding discretionary intake."
The Colorado statutes specify that the choice of manner of
handling the case must be based on a preliminary investigation.
However, the statutes give no guidelines as to what information
should be included in this investigation or what criteria should
be used to determine whether the case should be filed or handled
unofficially. The only guidance offered is the flexible standard of
taking whatever action is required by the "interest of the child
or of the community."97
These vague standards surrounding the decision to handle
unofficially, informally, or to file a petition are not clarified by
of disinterested persons. Secondly, neither the notice requirements of the Code, COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § § 22-3-2, to -3 (Supp. 1967), nor that of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967),
are fulfilled by such a procedure, as administratively easy and commonly practiced as it
may be.
" A fairly substantial class of offenders has thus far not been discussed. They are the
out-of-town runaways or escapees from juvenile facilities in other states. One hundred and
sixty-five such runaways were processed from January to June of 1972 by the intake
division of the probation department located at juvenile hall. These children go through
the detention procedure outlined above and are detained, almost without exception, pend-
ing transportation back to their home states under the Interstate Compact on Juveniles,
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-8-1 to -8 (Supp. 1967). Most children are returned under the
voluntary return procedure of article vi of the Compact, although a small percentage are
requisitioned by the home state pursuant to articles iv and v. Almost as a matter of course,
if the child agrees to return voluntarily or is requisitioned by the home State, any charges
pending in Colorado are dropped or dismissed. These children rarely appear before the
court except in detention hearings and on occasion in requisition hearings, but they do
constitute a considerable portion of the Intake Division workload because their numbers
are both great and increasing, and because arrangements for their return are often com-
plex.
" Ch. 110, §§ 16-17, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 390, amending COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 22-3-1(2)(a) to -1(3) (Supp. 1967).
97 Id.
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officially promulgated administrative guidelines in the Denver
Juvenile Court. The only directive concerning filing which has
been issued is one by the presiding judge that felony offenses
alleged to have been committed by children already on probation
must be filed.
Because of the dearth of court-promutgated guidelines re-
garding this most important decision, it is necessary to rely for
information on probation counselors' practices as related by them
in structured interviews.
Eight different probation counselors were interviewed-field
and intake workers, both line staff and supervisory staff, and the
presiding judge of the Denver Juvenile Court. There were definite
trends among their comments. Most preferred to handle a case
unofficially as often as possible and viewed filing a petition as a
means to force cooperation or acceptance of a treatment plan by
the child or parents. One very candid subject noted that even
court-ordered treatment may not produce a positive response
from an intransigent family. Another mentioned the possible
harmful effects on the child which could easily result from court
intervention which was not needed.
Those interviewed saw the preliminary investigation as an
effort to obtain a "total picture" of the child, with the alleged
offense constituting only a part of that picture. Except for "very
serious" offenses, which counselors feel pressured to file, the
major concern seems to be first, whether the child needs help, and
second, whether formal court processing will facilitate receipt of
help by the child and his family. The comments continually em-
phasized the discretionary judgment exercised and the lack, and
perhaps impossibility, of strict guidelines.
The decision to file a petition is twofold; once a counselor has
made the personal decision to file a formal petition, he must
decide whether to file a delinquency or a CHINS petition. At one
point in the court's history, this decision was relatively uncompli-
cated. If a violation of a state law or a municipal ordinance were
alleged, a delinquency petition was filed; if truancy or runaway
were the problem, a CHINS petition was filed. However, recently
many counselors have begun to use CHINS definitions to encom-
pass delinquency allegations. A child who is an inveterate shoplif-
ter could certainly be said to be "beyond the control of his parent,
guardian, or other legal custodian,"98 and a child alleged to be
,1 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22 -1-3(18)(c) (Supp. 1967).
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using drugs regularly can be seen as a child "[w]hose behavior
or condition is such as to endanger his own or others' welfare."
9"
Generally, CHINS petitions alleging delinquent acts are filed by
probation counselors if a child's age suggests he is really beyond
the control of his parents and only tangentially a threat to the
community, if he is under the age of 10 years and a delinquency
petition cannot be filed, if the basic problem is perceived by the
counselor as a family problem and not a violation of the law or if
the child must come before the court but has no prior record and
the counselor feels a CHINS label will be less detrimental to the
child than a delinquency label.'00 The question in all cases ob-
viously is, is it a legal problem?
Unless a case is disposed of by informal adjustment or unoffi-
cially, the case, the child, and the parents will proceed to the next
critical juncture, the first hearing on the petition itself.
F. Plea Hearing
I would guess about 90% of the delinquency cases in juvenile court
are bargained out.' But the pleas are better from the DA's point of
view because the kids plead out to offenses as alleged on the peti-
tion-the original charge-instead of to a lesser included charge, as
occurs in the adult system.
Deputy District Attorney
in the Denver Juvenile Court
Although hundreds of children in the Denver Juvenile Court
participate each year in the tactic of plea bargaining, very few
understand the process. Plea bargaining in the juvenile system
results in substantially less benefit to the accused than it does in
the adult system, where a guilty plea nearly always reduces the
potential extent of the punishment. Under the Code, however,
almost exactly the same dispositional alternatives are open to the
Id. § 22-1-3(18)(d) (Supp. 1967).
One point which should be mentioned regarding the developing practice of filing
delinquency allegations under CHINS petitions is that the reverse does not occur, at least
in such an obvious manner. Children who run away from home could in most cases also
be cited for curfew violations, prostitution, panhandling, drinking under age, or some
other delinquency offense which occurs as a result of their new-found "freedom." Proba-
tion counselors, in such cases, usually file the primary offense-the runaway-under a
CHINS petition, and the DCD usually does not push filing of the relatively minor munici-
pal ordinance violations which result from the runaway.
1*1 In fiscal year 1971-72, 1,817 petitions were filed in the Denver Juvenile Court as
CHINS, revocation of CHINS probation, delinquency and revocation of delinquency pro-
bation. Of these, only 176, just under 10 percent, resulted in trials, 50 to a jury (all
delinquency) and 126 to the court (123 delinquency).
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court, regardless of the number or types of offenses admitted. 02
The negotiating positions of the participants in the plea bar-
gaining process are comparable in both the adult and juvenile
systems. The district attorney usually is unwilling to dismiss sev-
eral charges if one allegation will be admitted for three reasons:
1) his perceived responsibility to the police department, to vic-
tims of juvenile offenses, and to society as to prosecute all wrong-
doers on all charges filed; 2) his opportunity to use a lengthy
record of admissions by a juvenile to argue at the dispositional
stage for commitment to the Department of Institutions or more
harsh sanctions, or if the juvenile reappears before the court, for
a transfer of jurisdiction to the adult system;'03 and 3) his belief
that mass dismissals contribute to a diminishing respect among
juveniles for the legal system.
Defense counsel participate in the practice of plea bargaining
to limit the severity of the disposition of each case and to thwart
possible attempts by the district attorney to have juvenile court
jurisdiction transferred later. Some defense counsel also believe
that parole can be obtained more quickly if there are fewer admit-
ted offenses, although this has not been substantiated. Finally,
many counsel, especially private counsel, conclude that if they
get half or more of the charges in each case dismissed, the child-
client will perceive that he has been well represented.
Most children are represented at plea hearings ' 1 by the pub-
lic defender or by an attorney or student from the Legal Aid
Society. The attorney may not have represented the child at the
detention hearing, and, in any event, counsel usually does not
receive a copy of the petition sufficiently in advance of the hear-
ing to conduct an investigation or to speak with the child prior
to the morning on which a plea must be entered.
Counsel generally asks the child if he has seen a copy of the
02 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-9 (Supp. 1967); Ch. 110, § 22, [1973] Colo. Sess.
Laws 392, amending COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-13(1)(b) (Supp. 1969); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 22-3-12(l)(h), (i) (Supp. 1967).
103 Ch. 110, § 20, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 392, amending COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
22-3-8(4)(a) (Supp. 1969). An adjudication for a delinquent act which would be a felony
if committed by an adult also brings into play the possibility of a direct filing in the adult
criminal system as discussed in Ch. 110, § 1, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 384, amending
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-3(17)(b) (Supp. 1969).
104 Almost all plea hearings are scheduled before a Denver Juvenile Court referee, and
since July 1, 1973 the child no longer has a right to request a judge to hear his entry of
plea. Ch. 110, § 7, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 387, amending CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-
10(4) (Supp. 1967).
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petition. Most answer "no," indicating that they have not seen
it, do not remember it, or do not know what a petition is. After
the petition is shown to the child and the charges explained,
counsel advises the child of his rights'05 and explains the purpose
of the plea hearing,'"1 making clear that whether or not the
charges are true, the child may insist that the district attorney
prove them. If the child wishes to admit one or more of the allega-
tions in the petition, counsel advises the child that probation,
removal from his family, or commitment may be the consequence
of entering an admission.' ° If the child persists in his desire to
enter a plea of admission, counsel then probes the voluntariness
of the plea.'" s
The voluntariness of pleas of admission in the Denver Juve-
nile Court is often questionable, primarily because of the involve-
ment of probation counselors in planning the disposition. The
child's attorney must carefully explain that while the probation
counselor may already have made some plans, they are only rec-
ommendations and the judge or referee is free to reject them. 0 9 If
10 See discussion of legal and constitutional rights of the child supra notes 59-67 and
accompanying text.
"" A typical and understandable explanation might be worded:
"In the hearing today, the referee just wants to know whether you admit
the charges (or the burglary, runaway, etc.) or whether you deny the charges
and want the district attorney to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. He
would have to call witnesses to prove that the charges are true, and we could
ask those witnesses questions and have our own witnesses to show that the
charges are not true. We could have a jury trial or we could just let the judge
decide. Even if you think that the charges are true, you don't have to admit
them-you don't have to help the district attorney out; you have a right to
have them proved against you. Can you decide what you want to do?"
"0 Counsel might utilize the following format:
"You know that if you admit this charge, that will give the court power
over you for 2 years or maybe even longer. The referee (or judge) could put
you on probation which means that you would have to visit with a probation
counselor probably once a week or so, and he or she would be keeping an eye
on you. The court could also take you away from your family and put you
someplace else to live-like in a group home or on a ranch. The court could
even lock you up for 2 years at Mountview or Lookout. The court can't do
any of these things unless you admit the charges or unless they're proved
against you in a trial. Do you still think you want to admit the charges?"
" "You know you don't have to admit the charges? Do you think anyone made you
decide to admit them? Has your probation officer or anyone else promised you anything
if you admit? Is this what you want to do even though you know what could happen?"
I Whenever delinquency allegations are involved, CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-
8(1)(b) (Supp. 1967) forbids probation department investigation and study of possible
dispositional recommendations prior to adjudication or entry of a plea of admission.
However, it is broadly known and frankly admitted by probation counselors that planning
for disposition begins probably at the filing stage, but certainly before adjudication.
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the child is entering an admission based on a perceived disposi-
tion, the plea is involuntary.
A concept which is a source of difficulty for children is the
right of having charges proved against them, particularly if the
children know the allegations are true or know that they were
involved in the alleged offense. Most children feel that if they
"did it," denying the allegations is lying. Often a child can be
educated if his attorney will explain that a denial of allegations
really means that the child wants to have the charges proved in
trial. Counsel might briefly describe trial procedure. Neverthe-
less, even after such an explanation, some children never under-
stand their right to trial.
If the child wishes to deny the charges, counsel questions him
more thoroughly about the alleged offense and begins to evaluate
possible defenses. On account of their shortened preparation
time, some attorneys deny all allegations in each petition so that
an investigator can establish the facts prior to the omnibus hear-
ing. Others proceed with whatever a child tells them and willingly
enter admissions at the plea hearing.
Because most children desire to admit guilt, because many
already have incriminated themselves in conversations with their
probation counselors, because the majority of attorneys or law
students are inexperienced in practicing in Denver Juvenile
Court, and because some attorneys view probation as an inconse-
quential punishment, it is possible that some children admit alle-
gations despite the availability of a valid legal defense. It is also
common for prosecutors and defenders to cooperate in gaining a
conviction because "the kid needs some help." The legal ethics
of these positions are certainly questionable.
When counsel and the child have agreed to the plea that will
be entered, they proceed to a hearing before a referee. The plea
hearing is generally very short and routinized. The referee or
probation counselor introduces the case by identifying the parties
present and stating that the hearing is for the purpose of entering
a plea. Generally counsel for the child waives both a formal ad-
visement of the child's rights by the court and a reading of the
petition. The judicial officer than asks whether the child is pre-
pared to enter a plea. Unless counsel requests either a continu-
ance based on lack of notice or a need for further investigation,
or a dismissal based on insufficiency of service, he enters the
child's plea. If a denial is entered, the case is set for an omnibus
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hearing before a judge. Unless the issues of detention or bond are
raised and argued, that terminates the plea hearing.
If an admission of one or more of the charges is entered, the
referee should inquire into the voluntariness of the plea. The
format which should be used is similar to that suggested for use
by counsel"' for the child. However, some judicial officers either
do not inquire into voluntariness or perfunctorily ask if the ad-
mission is being made under any threat, promise, or coercion.
Most children will say "no," even if they do not understand the
question. Once the judicial officer is satisfied as to the voluntari-
ness of the plea and some disposition has been made of any re-
maining counts,"' he accepts the plea and sets the case for dispo-
sitional hearing.
Ninety percent of the children named in petitions filed in the
Denver Juvenile Court enter admissions of guilt. It is impossible
to determine how many of these have an informed understanding
of their rights and the consequences of their admissions. Most are
represented by legal counsel, advised of their rights, and formally
questioned as to the voluntariness of their admissions. Although
the statutory requirements are met, it is debatable, in view of the
uncomprehending acquiescence of some children, whether the
constitutional requirements of due process are also satisfied.
The Code, Rules of Juvenile Procedure, Colorado case law,
and administrative guidelines promulgated by the Denver Juve-
nile Court are silent as to the plea hearing."' The drafters of the
Code and Rules apparently contemplated one or, at the most, two
hearings for an alleged CHINS or juvenile delinquent. The adju-
dicatory hearing"3 was established to determine "whether the
1W See note 112 infra.
If only one or two of several allegations is admitted to, defense counsel will move
for the dismissal of the other counts. If those other counts are CHINS allegations, the court
will usually dismiss them forthwith. If they are delinquency allegations, the concurrence
of the district attorney's representative is usually required. If that concurrence is not
forthcoming, the remaining charges will be set for omnibus hearing, usually in a couple
of weeks.
"I The only mention of the hearing is found at Ch. 110, § 7, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws
386, amending CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-10(3) (Supp. 1967), and even there it is not
denominated a "plea hearing." The "advisement hearing" discussed in CoLo. R. Juv. P.
8 could well be the plea hearing if that hearing is the child's first appearance before the
court; however, no mention of entry of plea is made in that rule.
1 Ch. 110, § 18, [19731 Colo. Sess. Laws 391, amending COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
22-3-6(4)(a), (c) (Supp. 1969); COLO. R. Jim'. P. 17.
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allegations of the petition are admitted or, if contested, are sup-
ported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.""' 4 Once the alle-
gations had been established beyond a reasonable doubt, whether
through admissions of the child or proof at trial, the court was
directed by the Code to "sustain the petition, and . . . make an
order of adjudication . "5... " The court could then proceed
with the dispositional hearing or continue the hearing on the
motion of any interested party."' Early in 1971, however, the
Denver Juvenile Court began to split the adjudicatory and dispo-
sitional hearings.
The plea hearing is an appropriate time for counsel to make
procedural objections concerning the petition itself or the legiti-
macy of court jurisdiction over the child. However, because there
is no right in a plea hearing to proceed before a judge in the first
instance, and because such issues are still timely if raised at the
omnibus hearing, most defense attorneys prefer to raise them
before a judge at that time.
G. Omnibus Hearing
The problem was moderately difficult-the solution relatively
simple.
In January of 1972, we started the experiment of an "Omnibus"
hearing, which is, in effect, a pretrial conference-but more.
Former Presiding Judge of the
Denver Juvenile Court
With the omnibus and adjudicatory hearings, the child's per-
ceptions become more and more confused because the hearings
become more and more legalistic. Especially at the omnibus hear-
ing, the child rarely says anything unless he decides to enter a
plea of admission. Even then he is advised and questioned by the
court. He will probably not see his probation counselor. For the
first time he will probably appear before a judge of the Denver
Juvenile Court rather than a referee, and he will appear in a main
courtroom rather than in the juvenile hall courtroom or a referee's
hearing room.
If further negotiation between the district attorney and de-
fense counsel results in a settlement, the omnibus hearing will
.' COLO. R. Juv. P. 17(a).
... COLO REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-6(6)(a) (Supp. 1969).
116 Id. §§ 22-1-3(21), -3-6(6)(b) (Supp. 1967).
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proceed as a second plea hearing, following which a date for the
dispositional hearing will be set. When the omnibus process was
first established, the presiding judge estimated that 37 percent of
the cases were settled. Since then this percentage has increased
to at least 50 percent.
If no settlement has been arranged, the judge will make sev-
eral inquiries of counsel, which in effect comprise the entirety of
the omnibus hearing. The judge will ascertain whether a trial by
jury is requested and, if so, whether it is to be a jury of three or
six persons; whether the jurisdictional matters of age and resi-
dence of the child are admitted, and whether there are any dis-
covery problems;"7 and finally, whether either side anticipates
the filing of motions. A date by which motions are to be filed will
be set, and if an extended hearing will be required, a preliminary
hearing on motions will be set prior to the date set for trial. To
further illustrate that omnibus hearings are at least perfunctory,
if not unnecessary, the Denver Juvenile Court sets all omnibus
hearings on Friday afternoons, at least two, and sometimes as
many as four, to the half hour.
There are no statutory provisions or rules of juvenile proce-
dure governing the omnibus hearing since it is essentially an
administrative procedure utilized only in the Denver Juvenile
Court.
By the end of 1971, delinquency cases in the Denver Juvenile
Court were taking an average of 265 days from the filing of the
petition to trial. Omnibus hearings were introduced to deal with
this problem. The short history of this experiment has been er-
ratic. Initially, omnibus hearings could be set a week or two fol-
lowing the plea hearing. However, because there remained the
problem of lack of notice of the allegations prior to the plea hear-
ing, all those cases which had been set for jury trial were being
set for omnibus hearing, so that by the summer of 1972, counsel
could secure an earlier date for a trial by jury than for an omnibus
hearing. This situation has been alleviated, but at the expense of
I" The district attorneys who practice in the Denver Juvenile Court are generally very
informal about discovery by defense counsel, and are willing, in most cases, to give their
files to the defense for purposes of copying the police summary sheet, copies of any
statements made by the child, and the results of any scientific tests or experiments made
in connection with the particular case. Extensive discovery motions are rarely filed either
by the prosecution or the defense because of the level of cooperation between the two.
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circumventing some of the original purposes of the omnibus hear-
ing.
Omnibus hearings are now generally set upon the entry of a
denial of the allegations regardless of whether a trial by jury is
requested. As noted above, many attorneys set omnibus hearings
for the purpose of having a hearing on motions before a judge
rather than a referee, whether or not a trial is anticipated. Fi-
nally, written motions no longer need be filed prior to the date of
the omnibus hearing, nor are pretrial motions argued at the omni-
bus hearing. Juries and witnesses may well be kept waiting for
extended periods of time while pretrial motions are argued unless
a separate hearing on motions has been docketed. Since adequate
and cooperative discovery has never really been a problem in the
Denver Juvenile Court,"8 the failure of the omnibus procedure to
dispose of pretrial motions really portends a failure of that proce-
dure altogether. If adequate notice and discovery were available
at the initial plea hearing, and counsel for both sides were em-
powered to enter into binding plea negotiations, most of the set-
tlements now reached at the omnibus hearing likely could be
reached at the original plea hearing, with a saving of court time,
and detention time for the child.' 9
Challenges to the petition, procedures, or relevant statutes
may be raised at the omnibus hearing.'20 The completion or ade-
1,' Because juvenile proceedings are civil proceedings, counsel for either the prosecu-
tion or defense could claim very expansive discovery rights under the rules of civil proce-
dure. COLO. R. Cw. P. 26-37. Only one rule, Rule 16, of the Colorado Rules of Juvenile
Procedure deals with discovery and it is very limited in scope and semantically inappro-
priate in cases where the child's right to discovery is at issue. Requests for a preliminary
hearing could also be utilized as a discovery tactic, though the Denver Juvenile Court has
yet to establish rules or procedures for this new provision of the Code. Ch. 110, § 15,
[1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 390, amending COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-1(1)(d) (Supp.
1967).
"I9 The omnibus hearing procedure may be impaired further by the 1973 amendment
to the Colorado Children's Code which allows the court to "conduct a preliminary hearing
to determine if there is probable cause to believe that the facts alleged in the petition bring
the child within the court's jurisdiction." Ch. 110, § 15, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 390,
amending COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-1(1)(d) (Supp. 1967). Thus far the court has not
dealt with the issues of whether the availability of a preliminary hearing makes the
omnibus hearing superfluous, or if not, when the omnibus hearing should be con-
ducted-before or after the preliminary hearing-or finally, whether the two are mutually
exclusive or if both may be requested by counsel.
,,I It should be remembered that the Denver Juvenile Court is governed in its proce-
dures first, by the Colorado Children's Code, and also secondly, by the Colorado Rules of
Juvenile Procedure. Where the latter are silent or otherwise inadequate, proceedings are
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quacy of the "preliminary investigation" required by the Code 2,
is a basis for a challenge to the filing by the probation department
of a delinquency petition,'22 and for a challenge to a CHINS or
dependency and neglect petition. Even if the preliminary investi-
gation has been completed and is adequate, the decision to file a
formal petition may be challenged on the grounds that it is un-
necessary in "the interests of the child or of the community,"'
'
and a motion can be made to remand the case to the intake
probation division for informal adjustment or dismissal.2 4 The
filing of CHINS allegations in a delinquency petition should re-
sult, upon motion of the child, in a dismissal or, at the least, a
refiling.'25 Similarly, the filing of delinquency allegations under
the CHINS rubric may be challenged, especially if the statement
of allegations does not conform to the statutory requirements.
2
1
The Denver Juvenile Court has been responsive to arguments
and proof that a child's problems are the result of an abusive
home situation and that the filing of a petition in dependency and
neglect therefore would be more appropriate' 27 than one in delin-
quency or CHINS. The court's willingness to order the filing of a
petition in dependency and neglect, and the dismissal of other
conducted according to the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure (CoLo. R. Juv. P. 1). Neither
the rules nor the Code discusses whether the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure may
be used. As will appear from the critical juncture dealing with the adjudicatory hearing
or trial, juvenile trials and adult trials are almost indistinguishable. Although Denver
Juvenile Court does not seem to have established any clear policy as to whether the rules
of criminal procedure may be used if the civil rules are inappropriate, the criminal rules
and terminology therefrom are in fact used repeatedly. Generally, counsel is well advised
to draft pleadings and motions under the juvenile or civil rules when at all possible, and
to assume that the court will either interpret those rules to cover what is in fact becoming
at least a quasi-criminal proceeding, or will give permission to counsel to utilize the
criminal rules.
121 Ch. 110, §§ 15-16, [19731 Colo. Sess. Laws 390, amending COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 22-3-1(1)(c), -3-1(2)(a) (Supp. 1967).
2 Ch. 110, § 15, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 390, amending COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §
22-3-1(1) (Supp. 1967). If the delinquency petition has been filed by the district attorney,
the court must accept the filing. Id.
Im Ch. 110 § 16, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 390, amending CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§
22-3-1(2)(a), (b), (c), (d) (Supp. 1967).
1 Id. §§ 22-3-1(2)(b), (d) (Supp. 1967).
15 See discussion of In re D.R., 29 Colo. App. 525, 487 P.2d 824 (1971) supra at note
20.
126 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-2(2)(a) (Supp. 1967); COLO. R. Juv. P. 12.
121 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-1-3(19), -3-1(2) (Supp. 1967); COLO. R. Juv. P. 26.
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actions, occurs most frequently when CHINS petitions have been
filed or when delinquency petitions concerning children under the
age of thirteen are at issue. Otherwise, unless a serious and con-
tinuing pattern of neglect and abuse can be shown, the court will
rarely take this step.
Other appropriate motions at the pretrial stage include mo-
tions for joinder of a respondent parent or legal custodian whose
appearance is deemed necessary to the action,"8 and for appoint-
ment of a guardian ad litem.2" The latter is customary when the
child has no parents or they refuse or are unable to appear, when
there is a conflict between parent and child, or when the court
determines such appointment is in the child's best interest or
necessary for his welfare.
Motions to suppress evidence or statements are filed and
generally heard prior to trial. There is, however, no interlocutory
appeal from the juvenile court of the denial or granting of a mo-
tion to suppress. 30 A prerequisite to the admissibility of a child's
statements or admissions in response to police interrogation is a
showing by the people of the presence of the parent at the interro-
gation, 3' the advisement of both parent and child of their rights,
the comprehension by both of the significance of their rights, the
knowing and intelligent waiver by both of those rights, and the
voluntariness of the statements or admissions made by the
child.'32 An exception to this exclusionary rule exists if the child
is emancipated by marriage or military service, or "if the child is
a runaway from a state other than Colorado and is of sufficient
age and understanding.' '
33
... COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-3(4) (Supp. 1967); COLO. R. Juv. P. 13(c).
... COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-5(3) (Supp. 1971).
"I People v. P.L.V., 176 Colo. 342, 490 P.2d 685 (1971). COLO. App. R. 4.1 is denomi-
nated "Inter-locutory Appeals in Criminal Cases."
3 ' A recent Colorado case states that "mere physical presence does not satisfy the
requirements of the statute concerning confessions of a child." The parent "must be in a
position to give advice freely [and a] parent who is himself incarcerated is in no such
position." In re L.B., 513 P.2d 1069, 1070 (Colo. App. 1973). Here the father had been
incarcerated for drunkenness and was brought from his cell to advise his son who had been
taken into custody for an alleged burglary.
02 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-2(3)(c) (Supp. 1971). The Colorado Supreme Court
has held in People v. Reyes, that the protections afforded a minor under this statute with
regard to waiver of his fifth amendment rights are equally applicable to waiver of the
minor's fourth amendment rights. 174 Colo. 377, 483 P.2d 1342 (1971). With regard to a
minor's fourth amendment rights in Colorado, see also In re B.M.C., 506 P.2d 409 (Colo.
App. 1973).
11 The evidentiary problems are obvious. Proof of emancipation is a factual determi-
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Counsel for the child may request psychological or psychiat-
ric evaluation prior to the adjudicatory hearing. Generally the
court will deal with the issue of mental illness or deficiency in the
pretrial stage, 34 although the Code provides that such evidence
shall be introduced at the adjudicatory hearing. 35 If it is estab-
lished that the child is mentally ill, his case must be transferred
to the Probate Court of the City and County of Denver,3 which
has exclusive jurisdiction in the adjudication of the mentally ill
of whatever age.' 37 The test for whether the Denver Juvenile Court
retains jurisdiction over the child is not the legal sanity test used
in the adult criminal court, but is whether "the child is mentally
ill or mentally deficient to the extent that short-term or long-term
hospitalization or institutional confinement and treatment is re-
quired."'' 38 If so, the juvenile court must transfer the case. The
difficulty with the test is that it is even more vague and more
dependent upon the philosophy of the examiner than is the test
for legal sanity.
H. Adjudicatory Hearing
The court which must direct its procedure even apparently to
do something to a child because of what he has done, is parted from
the court which is avowedly concerned only with doing something
for a child because of what he is and needs, by a gulf too wide to be
bridged by any humanity which the judge may introduce into his
hearings, or by the habitual use of corrective rather than punitive
methods after conviction.'
The adjudicatory hearing or trial of a juvenile in Denver so
closely resembles an adult criminal trial that, except for the age
and size of the "defendant," the legal terminology used, and the
nation to be made by the court, and in Colorado, there are no degrees of emancipation; a
child is either emancipated or not, for all purposes or none. Poudre Valley Hospital v.
Heckart, 491 P.2d 984 (Colo. App. 1971). Marriage or military service alone does not confer
an emancipated status on a child under the age of 21 years as the new section would seem
to intimate.
01 The court can do so by utilizing its powers under COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-
4(3) (Supp. 1967). The problems caused in the dispositional phase by the Code sections
dealing with mentally ill and deficient children are discussed infra at notes 158, 168, and
169.
' Id. § 22-3-7(1)(a) (Supp. 1967).
OS COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
I3 d. § 9(3); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-1-4(1)(k), -3-7(5) (Supp. 1967).
" Id. §§ 22-3-7(2), (5) (Supp. 1967).
,W' Waite, How Far Can Court Procedure Be Socialized Without Impairing Individual
Rights?, 12 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 339, 340 (1922).
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number of jurors, most laypeople and a substantial number of
attorneys would find the two types of proceedings impossible to
differentiate.
A child and his parents face the trial setting with an in-
creased apprehension. Part of this is attributable to the formality
of the adjudicatory hearing, especially if a jury is involved.4 0 Both
child and parents have probably been told by defense counsel to
dress appropriately, not to chew gum, to speak only when spoken
to, and not to show emotion during the course of the proceedings.
The apprehension of the parties is compounded by the aunts,
uncles, brothers, sisters, and friends of the child who often accom-
pany him.
The trial constitutes the child's "day of reckoning." If a juve-
nile admits the allegations of a petition in a plea hearing, he
knows what to expect. He knows he will "plead guilty," that the
admission will be accepted by the court in most cases, and that
disposition will be delayed for at least two weeks. A trial is differ-
ent. The juvenile does not know what the outcome will be. Typi-
cally the child will not testify. He will understand little of the
fast-moving colloquy between the prosecution, the defense, and
the court, and his lawyer will not have time to explain much of
it to him. Even after the court has announced its findings, in
many cases the child will not know what decision has been
reached until defense counsel explains the result to him.
The formality of the adjudicatory hearing is in contrast to the
limited number of statutes, rules, and cases which define its para-
meters. The conduct of the hearing is only partially defined by
the Code' and the Colorado Rules of Juvenile Procedure,' and
has been mostly determined by Supreme Court cases of In re
Gault' and In re Winship.' The rights of children in an adjudi-
catory hearing as enunciated in these two cases' 5 are embellished
in Colorado by the right to a jury trial,' the right to raise various
I40 The informality permitted by the Code in hearings before the juvenile court (CoLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-7(1)(b) (Supp. 1967)) is not practiced in adjudicatory hearings.
' 1 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-3(2) (Supp. 1967); id. § 22-3-6 (Supp. 1967).
" COLO. R. Juv. P. 17.
1 387 U.S. 1, 31-57 (1967).
-11 397 U.S. 358, 365-68 (1970).
"'t See discussion of In re Gault and In re Winship supra at notes 60-64 and accompa-
nying text.
14' COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-1-6(4)(a)(i), (ii) (Supp. 1967). This right to a jury
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legal challenges prior to or during trial,'47 and the right of ap-
peal.
148
The administrative overlay on the formal law at this stage of
the proceedings is sparse. The court personnel most responsible
for that overlay, the probation counselors, play almost no role
whatsoever in the adjudicatory hearing,'49 which is almost solely
the province of the attorneys and the judge. As such it represents
the best or the worst of the juvenile court, depending upon
whether one perceives it as strictly a court of law, or as a social
agency with powers of legal sanction.
However, if the allegations in the petition are sustained, the
prominence and power of the probation counselor come to bear
fully in the dispositional hearing, the next critical juncture.
I. Dispositional Hearing
(1)(a) The general assembly hereby declares that the purposes
of this chapter are:
(b) To secure for each child, subject to these provisions, such
care and guidance, preferably in his own home, as will best serve his
welfare and the interests of society;
(c) To preserve and strengthen family ties whenever possible,
including improvement of home environment;
(d) To remove a child from the custody of his parents only
when his welfare and safety or protection of the public would other-
wise be endangered; and
(e) To secure for any child removed from the custody of his
trial for juveniles in Colorado had been maintained in spite of the conclusion reached by
the United States Supreme Court that "trial by jury in the juvenile court's adjudicative
stage is not a constitutional requirement." McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545
(1971).
"I Supra at notes 70, 120 and accompanying text.
148 Ch. 110, § 110, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 387-88, amending COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-1-12 (Supp. 1971). The 1973 amendment to this section gave the people the right to
appeal questions of law in delinquency cases. Motions for a new trial or a rehearing are
governed by COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-17 (Supp. 1967) and COLO. R. Juv. P. 55, 57,
and by COLO. R. Civ. P. 59. Rule 56 of the juvenile rules of procedure governs motions for
arrest or modification of judgment, and the appellate process itself governed by the Colo-
rado Appellate Rules.
14 COLO. R. Juv. P. 17 as adopted in 1970, originally provided that no statements
made by the child "to any court employee" were admissible in evidence in the adjudica-
tory hearing unless the right to exclusion was waived by the child and his parents. This
section was deleted by a rewriting of the rule in 1971; however no probation counselor has
ever to the knowledge of the writers been called by the people to testify in the adjudicatory
hearing as to statements made by the child, and many probation counselors consider such
statements privileged even though they are not in fact privileged under the law.
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parents the necessary care, guidance, and discipline to assist him in
becoming a responsible and productive member of society."0
The purposes of the Code find their fulfillment, if at all, in
the dispositional hearing, for it is here that the juvenile court can
make real its promise to "[do] something for a child because of
what he is and needs. . . ."I"' The hearing, from the point of view
of the child and his family, is most critical, because it bares their
problems to the court and may destroy their physical unity. The
parents may be surprised to find that the dispositional hearing
does not necessarily focus completely on the child, but may result
in court orders to them as well to participate in a treatment
program designed for the family's benefit.
The Code provides that in all children's cases "the probation
department or other agency designated by the court shall make
a social study and report in writing," unless the requirement is
waived by the court and presumably by the child and his family
as well.'52 The social study is not to be commenced when delin-
quency allegations are involved until after the adjudication is
completed, 5 ' but this requirement is unrealistic and therefore
circumvented by the probation counselors.5 4 It would appear
that, at most, the information gathered for the court report is
merely an expansion of the information already obtained in the
preliminary investigation to determine whether a petition should
'50 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-2 (Supp. 1967).
W5' aite, supra at note 139.
'5 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-8(1)(a) (Supp. 1967); COLO. R. Juv. P. 19, 20.
'5' COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-8(1)(b) (Supp. 1967); COLO. R. Juv. P. 20(b), (d).
'5' Intake Probation Supervisor:
A. I think an awful lot of information gained at the preliminary investiga-
tion can be later used in the social history. . . .An awful lot of the social
investigation is begun at the time of the first interview, and even though the
Children's Code asks for a separate social investigation after the court takes
jurisdiction, I don't see how you can readily separate those totally in reality.
Q. Do you think that it is unrealistic to talk about two distinct investiga-
tions?
A. I think that two investigations are necessary, but they overlap so much
that sometimes they become indistinguishable. A preliminary investigation
is often done in a time of crisis; parents and child are going to be more willing
to divulge things at that time, because they want to resolve the problem.
That kind of preliminary investigation is usually only supplemented in your
final investigation by specific things like psychological interviews or definite
school reports with exact grades and this kind of thing, or a more specific
social history in terms of childhood illnesses.
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be filed. The purpose of the report, as described by the Code, is
to help in "determining proper disposition of a child.""'
To aid in accomplishing the purpose of the dispositional
hearing,15 1 which is to determine "the proper disposition best
serving the interests of the child and the public,"'57 "[t]he court
may have the child examined by a physician, psychiatrist, or
psychologist, and . . .may place the child in a hospital or other
suitable facility for this purpose."' 58 Many probation counselors
avail themselves of the opportunity for outside evaluation, even
though the procedure is often frightening for the child because it
"' COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-8(2) (Supp. 1967). An intake probation Supervisor
interviewed expanded on this definition in a very thoughtful statement:
Especially when we are dealing with people who do have 40, 50, 60 years of
their lives left possibly, to begin with the idea in mind that there are no
mitigating circumstances or there are no circumstances that might put a
different light upon the situation, to assume what is happening around
him-I don't feel that this is a realistic approach to life.
Basically, I think that this is the importance of the preliminary investi-
gation and the social history-that the probation counselor has to be .. .
aware of human nature, family life, community resources, community pres-
sures, [and] individual psyches. In other words, he's got to be that semigod
sitting between the Almighty and the earth, trying to decide exactly what is
in the best interests of this child. I don't know if I answered your question
or not. To me, it's a matter of how you approach life. I don't quantify
life-it's a quality thing-and I can't give this much retribution for so much
infraction. And I think that the whole basis of the Children's Code is
this-that we don't give retribution for infractions. We give remedies for
situations.
56 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-3(21) (Supp. 1967) defines the dispositional hearing.
Id. § 22-3-9(1) (Supp. 1967).
'5' Since in most cases there has been no adjudication of the child's case prior to
examination, as required by COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-9(1) (Supp. 1967), there can
arise the problem of the evaluation information being used in violation of section 22-1-
8(1)(b) (Supp. 1967). However, this legal argument is rarely raised when the court orders
psychological or psychiatric evaluation prior to adjudication. First, the participants-
child, family, probation counselors, lawyers and court-assume adjudication once a plea
of admission has been entered or the allegations have been proved at trial. This is gen-
erally a valid assumption to be made, unless the child is one who might be placed on a
continued petition under section 22-3-6(3) (Supp. 1967), and such children are rarely
seen to be in need of medical evaluation. Secondly, any objection which might be raised
to the procedure of evaluation prior to adjudication could be answered by the court's
interpreting broadly its powers under section 22-1-4(3) (Supp. 1967) to issue temporary
orders providing for "medical treatment" prior to adjudication or disposition, if deemed
in the best interest of the child. This problem of evaluation prior to adjudication will not
be discussed again but is a problem in almost every critical juncture, since in the Denver
Juvenile Court, the order adjudicating a child delinquent or in need of supervision imme-
diately precedes the orders of disposition in the dispositional hearing.
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means to him that he is "crazy." In the interviews conducted, the
counselors and supervisors were asked in what percentage and
what kinds of cases they requested psychological evaluation. The
extent of variation in their response is illustrated by the following
remarks:
Field Probation Counselor:
Q: When do you refer children to psychological services?
A: I don't refer a kid to [Denver Juvenile Court's] psychological
services' to be quite honest with you. I don't feel like waiting for
two or three months; I want it now. I usually refer to children's
diagnostic center.'6 ' When a kid is not motivated [and] I feel maybe
that he has average abilities, but [is] maybe using diugs and
maybe having a lot of conflicts with the parents, really doesn't know
where he or she is at or where they're going, then I refer to CDC and
get a medical workup-psychological, psychiatric, the whole gamut.
Q: What percentage of your cases do you refer for some sort of
psychological evaluation?
A: Probably 50 to 75 percent.
Intake Probation Counselor:
Q: On what percentage of the children you work with do you request
psychological evaluation?
A: I would say maybe 5 to 10 percent of my cases, something like
that. . . . I think most children are all right psychologically; I don't
think they necessarily need the professional services of a psycholo-
gist. . . . Some people seem to refer a lot of children to psychologi-
cal services when it is really not necessary. They are having some
typical problems that you have at that age. . . . Kids are going to
The psychological services of the Denver Juvenile Court are housed in a building
immediately adjacent to juvenile hall. The major function performed by the unit is predis-
positional evaluation of children detained in the hall. The evaluation generally consists
of an interview with the child which may last from half an hour to an hour and a half,
and the administering of up to two or three psychological tests to determine I.Q., apti-
tudes, etc. The time necessary to receive a written report is often as long as 6 weeks or
longer. There are no Ph.D psychologists on the staff and there is one consulting psychia-
trist who devotes three hours a week to the unit. In addition to the two regular staff
members, there are generally a couple of student interns who participate in testing and
evaluation.
10 Children's Diagnostic Center (CDC) is a unit of the University of Colorado's Medi-
cal Center. The evaluations performed by CDC are comprehensive and occur over about
a week. Both parents and child are evaluated psychologically. The child usually sees a
psychiatrist as well, and has a complete physical examination. If indicated, a neurological
workup is also completed on the child. Written reports from CDC are delayed extensively,
although a "staffing" involving the psychologist, social worker, and probation counselor
can usually be arranged within a week or two following the evaluation. CDC evaluations
almost always recommend detailed treatment plans.
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have all kinds of experiences and some people are going to think they
need very professional help when they don't. It's putting a load on
our services there for children who really do need this service. So, I
think it's a lack of understanding. We all grew up in different envi-
ronments and different experiences. When I refer a child to psychol-
ogical services, it's because I definitely feel that he needs special
help or he needs special evaluation in determining what to do. In
most situations, I do not refer.
The final dispositional recommendations made by the proba-
tion counselor are strongly influenced by the results of the psy-
chological, psychiatric, or medical testing. The child rarely, if
ever, sees the written report of the examination. Any explanation
of the diagnosis camouflages the real meaning of the tests. If the
results of court ordered evaluations are to be used in the disposi-
tional hearing, counsel must receive a copy, and the author of the
report may be required to be present at the hearing to be cross-
examined.''
Following the psychological or psychiatric examination of the
child, or perhaps simultaneously with it, the probation counselor
must begin to formulate his own recommendations for the dispo-
sition of the child. Although the Code suggests a number of dispo-
sitional alternatives, it contains no standards for choosing among
them other than that the determination be in the "best interests
of the child and the public."'' 2 Most alternatives may be utilized
for either delinquents or CHINS.6 3 These include placing the
child on probation or under protective supervision 4 in the legal
custody of his parents' 5 or a relative or other suitable person. "'
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-1-8(2), (3) (Supp. 1971); COLO. R. Juv. P. 19(b).
,02 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3-9(1), .12(1)(g) (Supp. 1967); id. § 22-3-13(1)(a)(ii)
(Supp. 1969).
,13 Adjudicated delinquents over 16 years of age can also be committed to the depart-
ment of institutions with a recommendation from the court that placement be made in
the state training school at Buena Vista, Colorado. If the child is adjudicated delinquent
for an act which occurred before his 18th birthday, but he is 18 or older at the time of the
dispositional hearing, the court may sentence such a person to the county jail for a period
of time not to exceed an aggregate total of 180 days. Finally, the court may impose a fine
of not more than $300 on adjudicated delinquents. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-
13(1)(b)(22) (Supp. 1969); Ch. 110, § 22, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 392, amending COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-13(1)(b) (Supp. 1969); id. § 22-3-13(1)(c) (Supp. 1971).
"I The probation or supervision status may include assignment to a constructive
supervised work program provided the child's education is not curtailed and the work
program is designed to promote the rehabilitation of the child. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
22-3-12(1)(d) (Supp. 1967).
"' Id. § 22-3-12(1)(b)(Supp. 1967).
ISO Id. § 22-3-12(1)(c) (Supp. 1967).
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If placement in the child's own home would be detrimental to his
rehabilitation, the court may combine probation or protective
supervision with giving custody of the child to the county depart-
ment of public welfare or a child placement agency, or the court
may simply place the child directly in a child care center.'67 If the
child requires medical, psychological, or psychiatric examination
or treatment, the court may place the child in a hospital or other
suitable facility for that purpose. 6 8 The court may commit, or
transfer legal custody of, the child to the State Department of
Institutions for placement in a group care facility or other facility
as determined by the evaluation unit of that department. 9
Finally, the court may require, in combination with any of
the other alternatives, that the child pay for damage done to
persons or property, if such payment can be expected "without
serious hardship or injustice to the child."'70
Because of the overwhelming importance of the dispositional
hearing, the weight given by the court to the probation coun-
selor's recommendation in that hearing, and the vagueness of the
standards and guidelines of the formal law, each probation coun-
selor interviewed was asked what factors he considered in making
recommendations and whether or not the court set any standards.
Considerations weighed by the various probation counselors
were the availability of placement facilities, whether the child is
a prospective repeater, whether he would be better helped in the
community or in his home situation, and the child's attitude.
Most probation counselors put little emphasis on the specific
offense committed and were more child-oriented than public-
oriented. Even recommendations for a locked setting were viewed
in terms of protecting the child from himself rather than protect-
ing the community from the child.
Prior to the completion of the court report the district attor-
ney rarely communicates his views on disposition to the probation
117 Id. § 22-3-12(1)(e) (Supp. 1967).
" Id. § 22-3-12(1)(f). This is assuming that somehow the court has determined that
even though the child needs inpatient treatment, he or she is not a mentally ill or mentally
deficient child requiring transfer to the probate court. See supra note 158 and accompany-
ing text.
19 Ch. 111, § 1, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 393, amending CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-
3-12(1)(h) (Supp. 1967).
7' COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-12(1)(g) (Supp. 1967).
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counselor. The activities of defense counsel, meanwhile, are gov-
erned to a great extent by his perception of his role at the critical
juncture of disposition. Attorneys who believe that the probation
counselor is the only person with the time and expertise to deter-
mine what is the child's best interest take a passive role. A more
active role is taken by those attorneys who feel that the child's
wishes must be made known to the counselor and that the coun-
selor should be willing to adjust his recommendations to accom-
modate the wishes of the child insofar as possible. Any accommo-
dation depends on the development of a positive relationship
between defense counsel and the probation counselor, and is, in
essence, dispositional bargaining. It may take the form of an
agreement, for example, to out-of-home placement through the
department of public welfare in exchange for an abandonment by
the probation counselor of his recommendation to commit to the
Department of Institutions. In this situation, the attorney's
objective is to help the child and probation counselor reach an
agreement which will facilitate the child's adjustment to what-
ever disposition is finally reached.
Alternately, counsel and the child may propose and justify
their own set of dispositional recommendations without consult-
ing with the probation counselor. This most frequently occurs
when negotiation fails, or when the attorney or child feels that the
assigned probation counselor is either incompetent or not acting
in the best interest of the child. Because the probation counselor
is intended to perform the functions of referral for evaluation or
placement, gathering of school information, and arranging for
preplacement visits, this role is a difficult one for counsel to play.
Indeed he may find that he can obtain information which would
be given willingly to probation counselors only through court-
ordered discovery. Counsel may also find that while the probation
counselor would have no difficulty removing a child from deten-
tion for a preplacement visit, such a visit when arranged by the
child's attorney requires transportation and accompaniment by
a member of the sheriff's department.
Because of these system-imposed restraints, because most
attorneys who practice in juvenile court are somewhat unfamiliar
with the various possible dispositions, and because of heavy case
loads, few attorneys adopt an active role in pursuing dispositional
alternatives. Nevertheless, some, especially student interns with
few cases to handle, choose to negotiate. The approach adopted
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by the attorney dictates, to a great extent, the degree of adver-
sariness in the dispositional hearing itself.'7'
Four of the more common dispositional alternatives are (1)
continued petition, (2) probation, (3) out-of-home placement
without commitment, and (4) commitment to the department of
institutions.
1. Continued Adjudication of the Petition
Continued adjudication of the petition, "2 commonly called a
"continued petition" is usually granted in cases where a child's
infraction is minor, intensive supervision by the court is unneces-
sary, and treatment is either unnecessary or has been arranged
through a community resource without the need for a court order.
Continued petitions are also common when, prior to the disposi-
tional hearing, a child has been placed in an out-of-home setting
and responds to it.
In these cases, the juvenile court probably should not have
exercised its jurisdiction at all. The continued petition allows the
court, without dismissing the petition, to continue jurisdiction
and supervision with a minimum of time and resources. Often a
continued petition is granted when a child is very young and the
court wishes to attempt treatment without the necessity of label-
ing the child as a CHINS or a delinquent, or when the child is
almost beyond the jurisdictional age of the court and has had an
'" A brief discussion of the role of the attorney in juvenile court at the dispositional
stage is contained in the Counsel Table Feature, The Role of the Attorney in Juvenile
Court, 42 CLEVELAND B.J. 127 (1971).
7I Though the alternative of a "continued petition" is not mentioned as a possibility
in the sections of the Children's Code dealing with the disposition because it cannot occur
after adjudication, it is outlined in the section on the adjudicatory hearing as follows:
(3)(a) After making a finding as provided by subsection (6)(a) of this sec-
tion but before making an adjudication, the court may continue the hearing
from time to time, allowing the child to remain in his own home or in the
temporary custody of another person or agency subject to such conditions of
conduct and of visitation or supervision by a probation counselor as the court
may prescribe, if:
(b) Consent is given by the child and his parent, guardian, or other
legal custodian after being fully informed by the court of their rights in the
proceeding, including their rights to have an adjudication made either dis-
missing or sustaining the petition.
(c) Such continuation shall extend no longer than six months without
review by the court. Upon review the court may continue the case for an
additional period not to exceed six months, after which the petition shall
either be dismissed or sustained.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3.6(3) (Supp. 1971); COLO. R. Juv. P. 17(c).
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offense-free record prior to the incident at issue. The advantage
to the child of this dispositional alternative is that if there is no
further trouble the petition will be dismissed at the end of 6
months and there will be no adjudication noted on the child's
record.
The Code requirement that a review hearing be held within
6 months and that the adjudication be continued for no longer
than 1 year'73 is regularly followed by the court. However, Code
provisions making mandatory court advisement of the parent and
child of their specific right to have an adjudication made either
dismissing or sustaining the petition are rarely complied with.
Because most children given continued petitions have previously
entered pleas of admission to the allegations, the failure of advise-
ment is of negligible effect, as most parties offered the right to
adjudication would certainly waive it.
Few continued petitions have been granted in the Denver
Juvenile Court since the Code was amended in 1973 to allow for
expungement of a child's record prior to the expiration of a 2-year
period if all parties consent.'
2. Probation
The most common dispositional alternative recommended
by probation counselors and ordered by the court is probation, or
probation in combination with other alternatives.7 5 At least
1 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-6(3)(c) (Supp. 1971).
,7, Ch. 110, § 9, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 387, amending CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-
1-11(2)(a) (Supp. 1969).
,15 Probationary status is inconsistent with only two of the dispositional alternatives
discussed- continuation of the adjudication and commitment. In the former situation,
protective supervision, which is almost indistinguishable from probation except in name,
is given to the child. The most frequent combinations for adjudicated delinquents are
probation and restitution as provided in COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-12(1)(g) (Supp.
1967), probation and a fine, id. § 22-3-13(1)(c) (Supp. 1971), probation and psychological
counseling, id. § 22-3-12(1)(f) (Supp. 1967), and probation and the intervention of a
Partner, supra at note 91. While probation in combination with psychological counseling
or Partners is also common for adjudicated CHINS, the nature of CHINS problems makes
probation in combination with out-of-home placement with relatives or in a group care
facility more common for this type of child. Out-of-home placement without commitment
is discussed in the following subsection. CHINS dispositions often include as well orders
of protection under id. § 22-3-10 (Supp. 1967) and COLO. R. Juv. P. 48, which orders may
set forth reasonable conditions of behavior to be observed by the parent or guardian of
the child. Protective orders may prescribe conditions of visitation between parent and
child, conditions of cooperation with an involved agency, support orders, or orders requir-
ing improved "parenting." Violation of protective orders subjects the parents to civil
contempt of court proceedings.
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three-fourths of the children appearing before the Denver Juve-
nile Court for disposition are placed or continued on probation.
Those who are denied probationary status are children whose
offenses are very serious and who are perceived to be a real men-
ace to the community, or those who are in desperate need of
intensive treatment and whose runaway patterns indicate they
will not remain in an open setting. Both types of children are
generally committed to the Department of Institutions for place-
ment in a locked facility.
If a child is placed on probation,' 6 the terms and conditions
of that probation are to be specified by orders of the court, given
to the child in written form, and explained fully to the child and
his parents by the court or the probation counselor.'"
The Code provides for a maximum period of probation of 2
years'78 and a mandatory review of the terms and conditions of
probation at least once every 6 months.'79 On the basis of such
review hearings, the court may either modify the terms and con-
ditions of probation or release the child from probationary sta-
tus. 1o
There are virtually no guidelines in the formal or administra-
tive law specifying the responsibilities of the probation counselor
to his probationer. Probation counselors are admonished to keep
themselves informed of the conduct and condition of children
placed under their supervision, to keep complete records of all
work done, and to "use all suitable methods including counseling
to aid each child under [their] supervision."' 8 ' Because failure
of the child on probationary status may indicate failure of the
counselor to meet even the minimum standards of contact and
supervision, because probation is such a common form of disposi-
tion, and because revocation of probation often results in commit-
ment, the formulation of standards of probationary supervision
would seem desirable.
In practice, probationers who continue to have problems re-
178 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3-12(1)(b), (c) (Supp. 1967); COLO. R. Juv. P. 22(a).
'" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3-18(1), -5-5(2) (Supp. 1967); COLO. R. Juv. P. 22(a).
17 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-18(2)(b) (Supp. 1967); COLO. R. Juv. P. 22(c). See
text accompanying notes 230-36 infra for discussion of revocation of problem.
'17 COLO. REV. STAT. AN.. § 2 2-3-18(2)(a) (Supp. 1967); COLO. R. Juv. P. 22(b). See
discussion of subsequent hearings to review placement or probationary status, supra notes
221-36 and accompanying text.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-18(2)(b) (Supp. 1967); COLO. R. Juv. P. 22(b).
'~' COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-5-5(3) (Supp. 1967).
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ceive attention, and those who do not may never feel the responsi-
bilities of probationary status. The probation counselors who
were interviewed recognized the limited extent of the supervision
given by field probation counselors. The majority felt that the
field probation officer is burdened by a shortage of facilities, a
heavy caseload, and an excessive amount of paper work, all of
which combined to prevent him from providing adequate supervi-
sion, carrying through with established treatment plans, and
meeting with the child in the community.
Probation can form the basis for a successful completion of
a child's involvement with the juvenile court, or, if he violates the
terms and conditions of his probation, for increased court involve-
ment through a revocation of probation petition. If the court
grants probation in lieu of incarceration, it is an act of grace
within its discretion.82 Whether or not the child falls from grace
depends on the child and the effectiveness of his probation coun-
selor.
3. Out-of-Home Placement without Commitment
When a child's home situation is a substantial cause of his
delinquent or CHINS behavior, out-of-home placement without
commitment is often the first dispositional alternative at-
tempted. It is often the second alternative when probation while
living in the home has failed because of family pressures.
Because the Code states that children removed from their
parents should be given "the necessary care, guidance, and disci-
pline to assist [them] in becoming responsible and productive
member[s] of society,"' 83 a determination of the type of out-of-
home placement best suited to fulfill that purpose is essential.
The court may place the child with a relative or other suitable
person,'84 such as a friend or neighbor. The court may also place
the child in a foster or family care home, 185 a child care facility
or center, 8 ' a group care facility or home,8 7 a half-way house,M
12 In re D.S., 31 Colo. App. 300, 502 P.2d 95 (1972).
" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-2(1)(e) (Supp. 1967).
Id. § 22-3-12(1)(c) (Supp. 1967).
Id. "Family home care" is defined in ch. 340, § 15, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 1224.
'' CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-12(1)(e) (Supp. 1967). "Child care center" is defined
in ch. 340, § 15, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 1224.
"I CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-12(1)(e) (Supp. 1967).
189 Id.
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or temporarily in a hospital or mental health center. 8 '
Placement without the intervention of a placement agency is
most often accomplished when the family agrees with the recom-
mendation of out-of-home placement, does not interfere with it,
and there are no funding problems. Otherwise, a recommendation
may be made to the court that it transfer legal custody 90 from the
parents to the county department of public welfare,' 9' or to an-
other child placement agency. 9 ' Transfer of legal custody, like
commitment, is for an indeterminate period not to exceed 2 years
and must be reviewed by the court within 6 months.9 3 It is
usually accompanied by appropriate protective orders to the par-
ents concerning, inter alia, visitation, support, and mandates to
cooperate with the agency."'
Once the type of placement best suited to a child's needs and
the desirability of a transfer of custody have been decided, the
difficult problem of funding the placement must be faced. If
placement is with a relative, funding often can be arranged volun-
tarily. However, because out-of-home group placements for ado-
lescents cost from $150 to $2,000 per month,9 5 the great majority
of parents of children exposed to the Denver Juvenile Court can-
not make a significant contribution toward the cost.
If either parent is an active or retired member of the military,
C.H.A.M.P.A.S. will pay for treatment at specified facilities.
Some placements, such as Job Corps or L.E.A.A. funded facili-
ties, are entirely financed by the federal government if the child
meets the criteria for admission. There are also some facilities
sponsored by private foundations which require no financial con-
tribution by the child if admission criteria are met. With most
out-of-home group placements, however, the sources of funding
in Denver are the Denver Department of Public Welfare or the
Colorado Department of Institutions. In the past, the department
IN Id. § 22-3-12(1)(f) (Supp. 1967).
Id. §§ 22-1-3(6)(a), (9) (Supp. 1967).
Id. § 22-3-12(1)(e) (Supp. 1967).
92 Id. "Child placement agency" is defined in ch. 340, § 15, [19731 Colo. Sess. Laws
1224.
"3 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-15(4)(a) (Supp. 1967).
194 Id. § 22-3-10 (Supp. 1967); COLO. R. Juv. P. 48. Parental rights and responsibilities
which remain after legal custody of the child has been transferred are defined in COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-3(8) (Supp. 1967).
" Forest Heights Lodge, a sophisticated residential psychiatric treatment facility, is
on the upper end of the cost spectrum.
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of institutions had been able to fund placements for noncommit-
ted children through a special federal grant for that purpose, but
since July 1, 1973, when the grant expired, only children commit-
ted to the legal custody of the department may be placed and
financially maintained by it.' 6 Excluding parental, federal gov-
ernment, or private support, the largest single source of funding
for out-of-home placements of noncommitted children in Denver
is the department of welfare.
When a probation counselor senses the need for out-of-home
placement financed by the department of welfare, he may refer
the cases to child welfare for placement. Although, statutorily,
" 'child welfare services' means the provision of necessary shelter,
sustenance, and guidance to or for children who are or who, if
such services are not provided, are likely to become 'delinquent',
'neglected or dependent', or 'in need of supervision' "17 and al-
though all children referred to child welfare for placement by
their probation counselors fit that definition, there are many chil-
dren whose cases are "not accepted" by child welfare or who are
accepted for family counseling but not for placement. If this oc-
curs, the probation counselor must investigate the placement and
request at the dispositional hearing that the department of wel-
fare be ordered to become involved, either by paying for place-
ment of a particular child in a particular facility or by being given
legal custody of the child. 9 '
If child welfare accepts the referral of a case from a probation
I, Ch. 112, § 2, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 395.
1,7 Ch. 340, § 3, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 1195.
"I Conflicts regarding the legal interpretation of the juvenile court's power to issue
such orders, and regarding the differing views of the professionals in the court and in the
department of welfare concerning the needs of a particular child resulted in a Colorado
Supreme Court opinion issued in 1973. The court found in City & County of Denver v.
Juvenile Court, 511 P.2d 898, 901 (Colo. 1973) that:
[TIhere can be no doubt that the juvenile court has the power and the duty
to make such determinations as it deems appropriate regarding the custody
and care of a child adjudicated to be within its exclusive jurisdiction ...
When the general assembly said that "this chapter shall be liberally con-
strued," it meant that it should be construed favorably to the best interests
of the child and society. It is the juvenile court's responsibility to determine
what that may be on a case by case basis.
Conflicts between the court and the Denver Department of Public Welfare are not far from
the stage of open warfare, regardless of the statutorily mandated cooperation and the
presumed desire of each to serve the best interest of the child and the community. Cooper-
ation is achieved between individual probation counselors and individual child welfare
workers in particular cases, but administratively the two public bodies are tragically at
odds.
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counselor, if the child welfare worker and the counselor agree on
a specific placement and award of legal custody, if the depart-
ment of welfare agrees to fund the placement, and if the facility
has an opening and the child meets the admission criteria, the
social worker and counselor can make a joint placement recom-
mendation to the court. Absent persuasive opposition by counsel,
or the child and his family, this recommendation will almost
always be accepted and ordered by the court. Given the possible
conflict with the department of welfare, the difficulty in finding
an appropriate and available placement facility, and the neces-
sity of justifying the selection, many probation counselors recom-
mend either probation, even if out-of-home placement might be
more appropriate to the child's needs, or commitment, which
transfers responsibility for finding out-of-home placement to the
evaluation personnel of the department of institutions.
If the court orders out-of-home placement at a particular
facility, the child will be placed or continued on probation and,
in many cases, moved immediately to his new home. Unless the
child has participated in a preplacement visit to the facility, the
move is a traumatic one usually involving change of neighbor-
hoods, if not communities, and of schools.
4. Commitment to the Department of Institutions
The final, and most severe, dispositional alternative is com-
mitment to the Colorado Department of Institutions. Commit-
ment requires a transfer of legal custody from the parents, guard-
ian, or agency custodian to the department.
Children adjudicated as either CHINS or delinquents may
be committed to the department of institutions and placed by the
department as provided by law.'99 The court may not dictate the
specific placement to be made, although it may recommend ei-
ther a specific type of placement, e.g. a youth camp, or a specific
placement, e.g. Lookout Mountain School for Boys. A former
legislator and juvenile court judge explains the rationale behind
this centralized commitment procedure:
In 1962, as a legislator, I was trying to get ready for having more
institutions in our state [than Lookout Mountain School for Boys
and Mount View Girls' School], and so I looked at the California
Youth Authority concept and wrote in a provision which was passed,
M" Ch. 111, § 1, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 393, amending CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-
3-12(1)(h), (i) (Supp. 1967).
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saying when the judge commits, he commits to the department of
institutions and not to any particular institution. I was trying to
develop the concept that the judge did not have the power to desig-
nate the institution. . . .So it was recognized, based on California,
that not every kid who certain judges would [commit] would have
to be institutionalized, and gave authority to the state department
of institutions to spin kids around right away. We know that there
are very discrepant commitment bases-a judge in a rural area with
no services at all will [commit] a very moderate offender instead
of only the most sophisticated offenders.
There have been problems in the Denver Juvenile Court with
the centralized commitment procedure. Sometimes the court has
been incensed when its recommendations have been ignored, and
defense counsel have argued that the court has the nondelega-
ble2 0 responsibility to "secure for each child . . . such care and
guidance . ..as will best serve his welfare ....
Nevertheless, commitment to the department of institutions
now offers the broadest range of placement alternatives on ac-
count of the facilities administered by the department itself and
the department's service contracts with many varied private
treatment facilities.
Most children who appear before the Denver Juvenile Court
think of commitment as placement at Mount View Girls' School
or Lookout Mountain School for Boys,20 2 which are closed facili-
ties offering academic training and group living based on a vari-
ety of behavior modification models. These training schools,20
3
were once properly called reform schools and fit that defini-
tion-custodial penal institutions for young offenders. In the last
few years, however, both schools, but especially Mount View,
have excelled in providing innovative treatment under the most
difficult of circumstances.
The child's misconceptions notwithstanding, commitment
may mean placement at the schools, the youth camps for boys, 204
the closed adolescent treatment center, various preparole release
homes and ranches administered by the Division of Youth Serv-
20o COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-2(1)(b) (Supp. 1967).
2"' It would seem that this argument has been mooted by the Colorado Supreme
Court's holding that "the [juvenile] court may delegate responsibility for placement."
Denver v. Juvenile Court, 511 P.2d 898, 901 (Colo. 1973).
" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-8-7(2),-8-6(2) (Supp. 1971).
2 Id. § 22-1-3(25) (Supp. 1967).
2 Id. § 22-8-8 (Supp. 1967).
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ices of the Colorado Department of Institutions, or one of the
numerous private facilities, both in and out of state, with which
the department contracts for the placement of children commit-
ted to its legal custody.
0 5
For delinquent boys over 16 years of age, commitment may
also entail placement at the state reformatoly, 00 the most secure
setting available for juveniles. For any committed child it may
mean release on parole following evaluation.2 7
The drawbacks to the dispositional alternative of commit-
ment are that it necessarily transfers legal custody, usually re-
moves the child from his community, and offers the possibility of
a locked institutional setting for a period of up to 2 years.20 8 Nev-
ertheless, some probation counselors, unwilling to wait for the
provision of community based services and having little time to
counsel their probationers, recommend and receive court orders
for commitment. Most probation counselors, however, still seem
to favor community based treatment when it is feasible, and view
commitment as a last resort.09
Court approval is a prerequisite to the placement of CHINS
at Lookout Mountain School for Boys or Mount View Girls'
School.2 10 If the department's evaluation indicates that the "child
requires placement in a state facility for the mentally ill or men-
tally deficient . . . [the department] shall place the child in the
appropriate facility'"" and, when the committing court is Denver
205 Id. § 22-8-10 (Supp. 1967).
' Id. § 22-3-13(1)(b)(ii) (Supp. 1969); id. § 22-8-16 (Supp. 1969).
21 Id. § 22-8-3(2)(a) (Supp. 1967).
"I Commitment of CHINS is "for an indeterminate period not to exceed two years."
Id. § 22-3-14(3)(a) (Supp. 1967), while commitment of delinquents is "for an indetermi-
nate period, but institutional placement shall not exceed a total of two years." Id. § 22-3-
14(3)(b)(i) (Supp. 1969). Upon petition by the department to the committing court, com-
mitment of CHINS or delinquents can be extended for an additional period not to exceed
two years if the petition sets forth sufficient reasons why such extension would be in the
best interest of the child or of the public. Id. § 22-3-14(3) (Supp. 1967).
2" One field probation supervisor interviewed stated:
[W]hen you separate them from the community, no matter what they learn,
sometimes they will come back into the community and have the same type
of problem and get involved in the same type of thing. . . .[M~y feeling is
to try to work it out and keep it in the community as long as possible. Then
if it doesn't work, I find that confinement with care is the next best thing.
210 Ch. 111, § 6, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 394, amending CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-
8-17(2) (Supp. 1971). No such approval is necessary for committed delinquents.
211 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-8-3(3)(a) (Supp. 1967).
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Juvenile Court, shall petition that court to transfer the case to the
probate court for a civil commitment.
2 12
A dispositional order of commitment effectively terminates
the child's relationship with the Denver Juvenile Court, even
though the court retains jurisdiction over him2 13 and even though
the court may require the department at any time to provide
information concerning the child .21  Probation counselors are
rarely ordered to continue a relationship with a child, although
some do. Nor do attorneys in most cases attempt to keep in touch
with the child. 15
If the probation counselor, counsel, and child engage in a
thorough discussion of dispositional alternatives prior to the dis-
positional hearing, the counselor's recommendations will usually
be uncontested. On the other hand, if the attorney does not re-
ceive the court report until the morning of the hearing, and if
neither he nor the probation counselor explains the recommenda-
tion to the child, the hearing may be difficult for all parties.
Dispositional hearings are conducted informally as provided
in the Code." 6 The probation counselor introduces the case and
the parties, after which counsel consents to the jurisdiction of the
court if the hearing is being held before a referee, and usually
22 Id. § 22-8-3(3)(b) (Supp. 1967). The department has authority to transfer children
committed to its custody to state facilities for the mentally ill or mentally retarded only
for a period not to exceed 60 days and only for evaluation or emergency treatment, unless
the transfer is followed by a probate commitment. Id. § 22-8-4(4)(a) to -(c) (Supp. 1967).
The one exception to this rule is the closed adolescent treatment center which is a closed
psychiatric facility operated by the department under an L.E.A.A. grant. Children in need
of psychiatric treatment may be placed in that facility without commitment through the
probate court.
213 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-19 (Supp. 1967).
2 Id. § 22-3-14(I)(b) (Supp. 1967).
2 This abandonment of the child by those who have worked with him or her is
described in the following lament by a former presiding judge of the Denver Juvenile
Court:
The important thing is that our court knows this child-our officers have
studied that child from beginning to end, heard the case, and I think we
should . . . track that child, if you will. I want the probation officers to
follow that child. Now the policy has been that once there is a commitment
to the department of institutions, the probation counselor phases out. That
is not right. That counselor should stay right in there and keep the court
advised-keep themselves advised-as to the progress of the child. They
should participate in the staffings that are held by the department of institu-
tions.
211 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-7(1)(b) (Supp. 1967).
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waives a formal advisement by the court of the child's rights.'"
The probation counselor then reads, summarizes, or explains the
information contained in the court report, his recommendations,
and his justification for them. Probation counselors rarely call on
other persons to testify or concur. Hearsay testimony is almost
always readily accepted by the court.
The district attorney and counsel for the child may cross-
examine the probation counselor. The more extensive examina-
tion is generally made by counsel for the child and usually seeks
to determine whether the recommendations of the counselor do
best serve the interests of the child, whether other alternatives
were considered and why they were rejected, and whether addi-
tional alternatives could or should be included in the recommen-
dations." ' If the counselor testifies as to the psychological prob-
lems and needs of the child, counsel may question his qualifica-
tions. However, unless it is obvious that the probation counselor
is incompetent or has prepared an inadequate social study or
court report, the court may protect him from rigorous cross-
examination.
Each side also has the opportunity to cross-examine the au-
thors of any other reports submitted to the court and to present
its own evidence."1 9 The court usually wishes to hear the testi-
"I It should be remembered that because the dispositional hearing in the Denver
Juvenile Court is almost always the adjudicatory hearing as well, a full advisement should
be given to the child by counsel or the court. The advisement at this stage should also
include advisement of the child's right to request a new hearing under COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 22-3-17 (Supp. 1967), and COLO. R. Civ. P. 50. Finally, the court or counsel for the
child should inform the child that adjudication in the juvenile court does not impose any
civil disabilities upon him or disqualify him from civil or military service application or
appointment, or from holding public office, nor can the adjudication, disposition or evi-
dence given in juvenile court hearings be used in any other hearings except further hear-
ings in juvenile court. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-9 (Supp. 1967).
"I For example, the additional recommendation of a referral to Partners is often
suggested by counsel and adopted by the probation counselor.
219 Counsel may legitimately request a continuance of the dispositional hearing if a
copy of the social study or court report is not received at least 48 hours prior to the hearing,
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-9(3)(a) (Supp. 1967); COLO. R. Juv. P. 20(c); if counsel feels
more tests or reports are necessary, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-9(3)(a) (Supp. 1967); or
if the authors of reports to be considered by the court in making its dispositional orders
are not available for cross-examination, id. §§ 22-1-8(2),(3) (Supp. 1967). If the hearing
is continued, the court must make appropriate orders for the release or continued deten-
tion of the child pending the rescheduling of the hearing. Id. § 22-3-9(3)(b) (Supp. 1967).
Even though the dispositional hearings of detained children are given priority on the
docket, id. § 22-3-9(3)(c) (Supp. 1967), counsel for the child may often waive the child's
right to a continuance if it would mean continued detention in suspense, and a delay of
treatment for the child.
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mony of the child and his parents. Counsel may make closing
statements, following which the court announces its findings and
recommendations or orders.
The advisability of predispositional hearing consultation
with the probation counselor is demonstrated in that eight out of
ten of the court's dispositional orders adopt exactly, or with only
minor modifications, the probation counselor's recommenda-
tions.
If the child is committed to the department of institutions,
a copy of the commitment order, or mittimus, is signed by the
court and given to the sheriff, who takes or returns the child for
evaluation to Denver Juvenile Hall, the receiving center for the
department of institutions. There is never a review hearing in
commitment cases.
This description of the dispositional hearing does not suggest
the tension and impersonality which are often present. The direc-
tor of field probation services for the court has commented on
these aspects as follows:
One of the inadequacies of the system is that you work in a vacuum
a lot-the whole court room scene is working in a vacuum. You are
making decisions based on data, impressions, and attitudes that you
are getting that do not belong to the actual happenings.
[I]t's like psychiatry. You are sitting in a room simulating life to
try to determine what to do about it. You are sitting in a courtroom
simulating [an] individual's life, simulating what his problems are,
diagnosing them, and recommending treatment. You are really
working in a think tank; you are working in a made-up situation...
where generally what the kid's whole life is about is told . . . by
people other than himself. . . . [Y]ou rarely hear much from either
[the] family or the kid, and then you are really making decisions
in a vacuum as to the treatment of the kid, based on what other
people say the treatment is all about .... [W]e are shooting in the
dark like everybody else is.
Following the dispositional hearing, the regular sessions of
most children with the Denver Juvenile Court are over. They
need anticipate only review hearings.
2
The rehearing and appellate processes available to the child in the Denver Juvenile
Court will not be discussed, as they are almost identical to those in the adult system.
Suffice it to say that appellate review of discretionary decisions made by a juvenile judge
"in the best interest of the child and the public" is almost never successful for the child.
See In re M.T. & G. McL., 508 P.2d 417 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973).
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J. Subsequent Hearings to Review Placement or Probationary
Status
Review hearings before the Denver Juvenile Court examine
placement or other terms and conditions of probation, or are held
on formal petition to consider the modification or revocation of a
child's probation. By the first review hearink, the court and pro-
bation counselor can almost always determine whether the dispo-
sition is in the best interest of the child, or whether the court must
again try to refashion his life. If the review is a plea on a probation
revocation petition, the court process will begin again.
The Code mandates certain types of review hearings. If a
child is placed on probation as a result of the dispositional hear-
ing, the court must "review the terms and conditions of probation
and the progress of each child placed on probation at least once
every six months."'2 Similarly, a court hearing seems required to
modify the terms and conditions of probation, 2 2 release the child
from probationary status,22 or terminate the jurisdiction of the
court prior to the child's 21st birthday.
224
If a transfer of legal custody was part of the dispositional
decree, it is valid for a period not to exceed 2 years, and the decree
must "be reviewed by the court no later than 6 months after it is
entered. 25 Modification or termination of the decree transferring
legal custody, 221 including extension of the 2-year limitation, must
be by court order.m
The requirements for mandatory review are not always met.
Often children are placed for longer than 2 years, petitions for
revocation of probation have been filed long after the expiration
of the 2-year probationary period, and the department of institu-
tions has funded placements of children whose commitments are
no longer valid. Both the court and the department of institutions
seem to lack a good followup system for informing the counselor
in charge when a hearing should be set.
"I' Cow. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-18(2)(a) (Supp. 1967); COLO. R. Juv. P. 22(b).
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-18(2)(b) (Supp. 1967); COLO. R. Juv. P. 23(a). But
see id. 24(d).
" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-18(2)(b) (Supp. 1967); COLO. R. Juv. P. 22(c).
14 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-19 (Supp. 1967).
2 Id. § 2 2 -3-15(4)(a) (Supp. 1967). Transfer of legal custody to the department of
institutions is exempted from this subsection.
COLO. R. Juv. P. 23.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-15(4)(b) (Supp. 1967). Extension of the 2-year com-
mitment period must also be by court order. Id. § 22-3-14(3) (Supp. 1967).
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Reviews of probation and jurisdiction hearings are conducted
in "nonappearance hearings" in which a probation counselor, ex
parte and with notice to no one, appears before the court, informs
the court of a child's progress, and recommends continuation or
termination of his probationary status. The child's right to ap-
pear at hearings held in his interest is diminished and, if proba-
tion and jurisdiction are to be terminated, his right to apply for
expungement of his record prior to the expiration of a 2-year
period on the consent of all parties is negated.22 He loses the
opportunity to appear before the court as a "success story" and
to be advised again, or perhaps for the first time, of the general
expungement procedures and that no civil disabilities have been
imposed on him.229 Most seriously, continuing a child on proba-
tion on the recommendation of his probation counselor, with the
child and his attorney unable to offer evidence in support of the
termination of probation and jurisdiction, is arguably a denial of
due process. It is therefore suggested that the nonappearance
review be used only if counsel and all parties have been notified
of the hearing and its purpose, and have waived in writing the
rights associated with it.
Review hearings with all parties present are generally very
informal and are used primarily to keep the court informed of the
child's progress. If a modification of the terms and conditions of
probation or a change in placement is recommended, it is usually
the joint recommendation of all concerned. If there is disagree-
ment, the probation counselor will seek to substantiate his recom-
mendation by filing a formal petition alleging violations of the
terms and conditions of probation or of specific statutes.20 The
case will then be docketed for a revocation of probation plea
hearing, rather than a review hearing.
The rights of the child at a hearing to modify or revoke pro-
bation are similar to his rights at his first hearing before the
court2 3' with a few notable exceptions. There is no right to a jury
trial in a revocation or modification of probation proceeding as
-- Ch. 110, § 9, [19731 Colo. Sess. Laws 387, amending COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-
1-11(2)(a) (Supp. 1967).
I" COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-9 (Supp. 1967).
2 0 Id. § 22-3-18(3) (Supp. 1967); COLO. R. Juv. P. 24. The discretion practiced in
original filings is also present in decisions to file modification or revocation of probation
petitions.
21 See notes 59-67 supra and accompanying text.
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the child has already been adjudicated. 32 A recent case, moreo-
ver, has held that revocation of probation hearings may be con-
ducted in an informal manner as provided in the Code, and that
in such hearings the juvenile court is not bound by the traditional
rules of evidence.233 In a later case, the same court concluded that
since hearings to revoke probation are not adjudicatory in nature,
the judge need only apprise himself of facts which convince him
that the conditions of probation have been violated. Proof of any
violation of law is sufficient to revoke probation, even if the proof
does not correspond exactly to the specifics in the petition.3
Proof by a preponderance seems to be the Colorado standard in
probation revocation hearings.
If the court finds no violation of probation, the child contin-
ues under the original terms and conditions of probation. 235 If the
court finds that the child has violated terms and conditions of
probation, the court in essence returns to the dispositional stage,
may request an updated court report, and may take any action
permitted by the dispositional sections of the Code.
3
1
The child has come the full circle. Whether he is released
from probation or is facing a probation revocation, the juvenile
justice maze through which he has come has been arduous and
painful. Those searching for "what is in the child's best interest"
might agree that the child himself, rather than the juvenile court
system, is the greater source of guidance.
"I COLO. R. Juv. P. 24(b).
13 In re B.L.M., 31 Colo. App. 106, 500 P.2d 146 (1972).
11 In re D.S., 31 Colo. App. 300, 502 P.2d 95 (1972).
' CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-18(3)(d)(iii) (Supp. 1967).
I" See generally, id. §§ 22-3-9, -3-12, -3-13 (Supp. 1967). If the petition for revocation
of probation is sustained, the court may revoke the probation of either a CHINS or a
delinquent who is over the age of 18 years and may sentence him to the county jail for a
period not to exceed three months. Id. § 22-3-18(3)(e) (Supp. 1969); Ch. 110, § 22, [1973]
Colo. Sess. Laws 392, amending CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-13(1)(b) (Supp. 1969).
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